Gabriel Algeria situation report

ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT

September 4, 2012

Executive Summary
Political Trends

· Ahmed Ouyahia has been replaced by Abdelmalek Sellal as Prime Minister, at the head of a new government.

· Sellal is close to Bouteflika – in whose successive election victories he has played a key role – and also to DRS chief Tewfik, a sign that the Bouteflika-Tewfik tandem is still functioning.

· A clutch of old-guard Bouteflika loyalists, including FLN leader Belkhadem and former Interior Minister Zerhouni, have left the government, signalling the decline of the once powerful clan of western Algerians around the President.

· All key ministries – Finance, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Energy, Defence – stay in the same hands as before, and overall there has been little change in the make-up of the government, with just three leaders of tiny, newly established parties, being rewarded with portfolios.

· The departure of Ouyahia may, however, augur a shift in economic strategy, towards more investor-friendly policies.
Foreign Relations

· One of the jihadist groups that now hold sway in northern Mali claims to have executed one of the Algerian diplomats it is holding hostage.

· Algiers remains reluctant either to get involved in military action beyond its own borders or to give its assent for an operation involving French or other non-African forces.

· With Paris pressing for an ECOWAS-led operation with French logistical and air support, Algiers’ unease continues to grow.
Security

· Contrary to expectations, there has been no “Ramadan surge” by AQMI, suggesting that the group may be suffering the effects of attrition.

· The south of the country, including the borders with Libya and Mali, have been largely quiet – although it is possible that an undeclared news blackout may be in force.

· The security forces are reported to have captured the head of AQMI’s judicial council, who was allegedly on his way to join up with the group’s units in northern Mali.





Political Trends



Finally, more than four months after the parliamentary elections that were supposed to be a major way-station on the path to political change, Algeria has a new Prime Minister, in the person of former Minister for Water Resources Abdelmalek Sellal, and a new government. The cabinet line-up unveiled on September 4, exactly 24 hours after it was announced that Sellal would be replacing Ahmed Ouyahia as head of government, is scarcely a radical transformation, however.



All key ministries stay in the same hands as before: Daho Ould Kablia stays on as Interior Minister, Mourad Medelci as Foreign Minister, Karim Djoudi as Finance Minister, Youcef Yousfi as Minister of Energy and Mining and Abdelmalek Guenaïzia as Assistant Defence Minister. Many lesser ministries have likewise failed to change hands, and while technically 15 out of 35 cabinet members are new entries, almost all have either held ministerial positions in the past or worked as senior civil servants in the departments they now head. There is no real political opening: the scenario of handing power (or the appearance of power) to tame islamist parties, à la marocaine, turned out to be a non-starter long ago, and reported soundings since the elections of parties across the political spectrum with a view to bringing them into government appear to have come to nought, or near to nought: three leaders of tiny, newly established parties who have agreed to play ball – Amara Benyounes of the Mouvement Populaire Algérien, Mohand Oussaïd Belaïd of the Parti des Libertés et de la Justice, and Amar Ghoul[1] of the TAJ – have been rewarded with cabinet positions, the remainder of the government being made up of members of the RND and the FLN and non-party technocrats, as before. Neither is there much by the way of generational renewal – the average age of incoming cabinet members may be slightly lower than the outgoing government, but scarcely enough for President Bouteflika to be able to claim that he has made good on his implied promise to clear the way for the rising, post-independence generations.



Overall, therefore, the whole operation is more of a reshuffle than a radical break with the past. This is very much in keeping with the established pattern under Bouteflika’s presidency, when changes of government have generally been the occasion for at best incremental change. Even so, on closer inspection the advent of the Sellal government does entail some subtle yet potentially significant shifts.



Arguably the most important changes are the departures rather than the new arrivals. Ahmed Ouyahia’s removal – expected for months, including by Ouyahia himself – was in a sense balanced by the departure of Abdelaziz Belkhadem, hitherto Minister of State without portfolio and personal representative of the President: on the one hand, this pre-empts speculation that the RND, of which Ouyahia is General Secretary, is losing out to the FLN, headed by Belkhadem; on the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, it removes from government simultaneously both the figures credited with ambitions to succeed Bouteflika in 2014. There have been some suggestions in the Algerian media that leaving government frees Ouyahia to start working seriously on preparing for the presidency, but there is no real indication that this was what Bouteflika intended. Indeed, there has been no sign yet that the succession question has been settled one way or another, and it seems likely that the tops of the regime – Bouteflika, DRS chief Tewfik, and their closest advisors – would rather postpone a decision on this matter (just as they seem to be pushing back to next year, or even beyond, the promised constitutional reform, which, if it were to include the creation of the position of Vice-President, might provide the occasion for designating a de facto successor).



Also of note is the departure of a clutch of ministers who, along with Belkhadem, made up the bulk of the Bouteflika old guard, having served the President faithfully and held ministerial office for the most part uninterruptedly since shortly after he came to power in 1999. Belkhadem himself entered government as Foreign Minister in 2000 and took over the FLN from the ‘renegade’ Ali Benflis in 2005. Other ousted old guard members include Yazid Zerhouni, once Bouteflika’s right-hand man as Interior Minister from 1999 to 2010[2]; Abdelhamid Temmar, who had held various portfolios connected with economic reform since 1999; Hachemi Djiar, a presidential advisor from 1999 to 2004, minister as of 2006; Nacer Mehal, loyal director of official news agency APS from 2000 and Minister of Communications as of 2010; Saïd Barkat and Djamel Ould Abbes, both ministers since 1999. Of these, furthermore, Zerhouni, Temmar, Mehal and Ould Abbes all hail from western Algeria and could be said to one degree or another to be part the clique of westerners that was seen as monopolising power after Bouteflika – himself born in Oujda, Morocco, into a family hailing from Nedroma in the Wilaya of Tlemcen – became President. Belkhadem, although originally from Aflou in the Hauts Plateaux, has also long been associated with this group. There have been signs for some years already that the cohesion and relevance of this “presidential clan” were on the decline; the Bouteflika old guard’s exit from government would seem to provide further confirmation that it is largely a thing of the past[3].



Sellal himself, it is worth noting, hails not from the west of Algeria but from Constantine in the east. In some respects he might be seen as a long-standing Bouteflika l oyalist, having served as his campaign manager in the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections and been a member of each successive government of the Bouteflika presidency (generally holding comparatively low-profile portfolios: Youth & Sport, Transport, Public Works and Water Resources). But he is above all understood to be very close to the DRS and to its head, Tewfik – indeed it appears to have been through this channel that his relationship with Bouteflika began, back in 1999, when as interim Interior Minister Sellal played an important role in orchestrating the election of Bouteflika (who owed his selection as the candidate of the military in large part to Tewfik). The elevation of Sellal – a faithful servant of the state rather than a politician in the usual sense of the word, who has no known presidential ambitions – can thus be seen as another sign that the Bouteflika-Tewfik tandem is still operational.



It has been widely suggested that the switch from Ouyahia to Sellal does not augur any changes in terms of policy. In light of the minimal changes in the government line-up that have followed the appointment of Sellal, this might seem to be a reasonable assumption. However it is an assumption that is not shared by one source – a friend of Sellal’s who also has regular access to the Presidency – at least as far as economic policy is concerned. With Ouyahia gone, the source suggests, the “economic nationalist” line that he[4] championed will be dropped, and Sellal will inaugurate a new swing back to policies that are more accommodating for foreign investors. A more or less abrupt U-turn on investment policy would, once again, be entirely consistent with the pattern established over the years by Bouteflika, who is remarkably un-dogmatic when it comes to economics and who appears to have been subject to lobbying for almost a year now from economic advisors such as Abdellatif Benachenhou to ditch Ouyahia’s “failed” eco-nationalist line[5].





Foreign Relations



As the crisis in northern Mali drags on, it becomes increasingly poisonous for Algiers. On September 1, the AQMI spin-off calling itself the Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (Mujao) announced that it had executed one of the Algerian diplomats it kidnapped in Gao this spring, after the Algerian authorities rejected its demands for the freeing of jihadists arrested in Ghardaia on August 15 (see below). The Algerian authorities say they are still trying to verify the reports, but have promised a “painful response” if they turn out to be true. In the meantime, another even more shadowy group, calling itself the Mouvement des fils du Sahara pour la Justice Islamique[6] has popped up unexpectedly with a video message lambasting the Algerian authorities for failing to take action to protect rank and file Algerian diplomats, demanding the application of sharia in Algeria and threatening to resume armed struggle.



Although it would doubtless like to have done with the islamist pseudo-state on its southern border, Algiers is in a quandary as to what to do about it. For the time being, Algiers is sticking to its doctrine of no military deployments outside of Algerian territory (which in this case would almost certainly entail the execution of the remaining Algerian hostages), but at the same time seems reluctant to give its assent to anyone else to do the job. In the early summer, Paris and Washington both reportedly pressed Algiers to either take part in an operation against the Ansar Dine-MUJAO-AQMI entity in northern Mali, or at least to give its assent to a joint French-ECOWAS intervention, but the Algerians seem to have been extremely reluctant to agree to any non-African (and a fortiori French) involvement.



In July French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius let slip that the use of force in northern Mali was “probable, at some point or another”, and since then there have been repeated claims that an intervention involving French forces is “imminent”. At the end of July, Alassane Ouattara, President of Ivory Coast and current ECOWAS chairman, told the French press that a military intervention, most likely to be carried out by ECOWAS forces on the ground with logistical and air support from the French, was a matter of urgency and could be expected “within weeks rather than months”. More recently, Algerian daily El-Khabar (31/08) claims to have obtained “leaked Libyan documents” that reveal a French military presence at the Karadabiya air base near Sirt, northern Libya, in which the newspaper sees a sign of French preparations for war in northern Mali[7].



At the beginning of September, Mali’s interim President Dioncounda Touré is reported to have formally requested a military intervention by ECOWAS forces to reconquer the northern half of his country from the jihadist groups that now hold sway there – an initiative that was announced, rather tellingly, via the French Foreign Ministry’s website. There seems to be some hope that an intervention sanctioned by both ECOWAS and the African Union (together, perhaps, with the United Nations), as opposed to a joint French-ECOWAS operation, might win Algeria’s approval. But the fact remains that ECOWAS will be hard pushed, in terms of personnel and logistics not to mention air power, to put together an adequate force, and so the question of French involvement remains posed, at least implicitly.



And the Algerians still appear to be extremely wary of this. The French involvement in overthrowing Col. Qaddafi in neighbouring Libya is still a fresh and bitter memory, and Algiers takes an equally dim view of Paris’ support for the opposition to President Bashar Al-Assad of Syria. Viewed from Algiers, developments on Algeria’s borders and in the broader region merely confirm apprehensions which, viewed from the outside, appear almost paranoiac. As Algerian daily L’Expression (07/09) puts it, when discussing the role of MUJAO:

The geopolitical situation in Mali is, of course, complex. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that there are unmistakable clues. Why are the Sahrawis mentioned by MUJAO every time [it makes a statement], amplified by Agence France Presse? “Who, apart from Morocco,” asks Sahrawi Foreign Minister Mohamed Salem Ould Salek, “has been trying for 30 years to sully the reputation of the Sahrawis and, by extension, Algeria, which supports the independence of the Western Sahara in accordance with the will of the UN?” Even so, at the level of the UN Security Council, Morocco enjoys the protection of a world power, which has major interests in Mali, and also in Morocco. Since the Libyan episode, that same power has been the ally of Qatar and is hostile towards Algeria, which represents a genuine stumbling-block for its neo-colonialist strategy.





Security



After a relatively quiet June, jihadist activity picked up in July and August, returning to levels comparable with the average recorded over previous months. July saw a total of 25 reported security incidents, of which 19 were Aqmi-initiated operations, and August saw a total of 25 incidents, of which 15 AQMI operations. Contrary to expectations, the “Ramadan effect” failed to materialise this year: the holy month of fasting, seen as particularly propitious for jihad and martyrdom, has often been the occasion for Aqmi to intensify its efforts, and in particular to launch suicide bombings, but this year’s Ramadan (July 20 to Aug. 20) saw 19 Aqmi operations, barely higher than average, and no suicide operations at all[8]. This stands in remarkable contrast to last year’s Ramadan, which coincided with August and saw 30 Aqmi operations and 40 incidents over all, including two suicide bombings, suggesting that AQMI’s operational capabilities in the north of the country are being worn down – giving the lie to last year’s alarmist reports that the organisation was be ing strengthened by inflows of weaponry and explosives from Libya.



Apart from the killing of a jihadist by the army near the town of Meftah on the southern approaches to the capital, on August 21, Algiers and its environs remained quiet. Even AQMI’s stronghold in Kabylia was unusually calm in August, with only three operations initiated by Aqmi recorded for the whole month; the security forces, on the other hand, were relatively active in tracking jihadists down (in just one incident on August 30, according to a Defence Ministry statement[9] , the army killed as many as nine jihadists in the area of Béni Amrane in central Boumerdès).



The south has also been remarkably quiet – although it is possible that this may in part be due to an undeclared news blackout. Only one incident was recorded on Algeria’s southern borders over the summer: according to Echorouk, on July 23 the security forces using helicopters intercepted “a convoy of Aqmi and Mujao fighters” near Tinzaouaten, wilaya of Tamanrasset, on the border with Mali, destroyed three offroaders and killed all 12 men on board and recovered 14 Kalashnikovs. The jihadists “had been trying to hijack fuel tankers”, according to the Arabic-language daily – seemingly in order to supply the AQMI/MUJAO/Ansar Dine alliance which controls northern Mali, which has been subjected to a fuel embargo since their takeover in April. Three weeks later, on August 15, security forces manning a roadblock at Berriane, Wilaya of Ghardaia, arrested three members of AQMI heading for northern Mali, reportedly including Tayeb Necib (aka Abderrahmane Abou Ishak Essoufi), head of AQMI’s “judicial council” and a member of the organisation’s council of elders.



For his part, AQMI’s national emir Abdelmalik Droukdel (aka Abou Mosaab Abdelouadoud) issued an audio recording around August 28 in which he berated the Algerian authorities for their treatment of Syrian refugees in Algeria, “which borders on persecution”. “These brothers came to Bouteflika seeking refuge from Bashar,” he said, “only to find they have jumped from the frying pan into the fire”. Syrian refugees “were taken in” by the Algerian regime’s lip service to “self determination and national liberation” and failed to notice that the Algerian government “has opposed all Arab revolutions and considered the revolutionaries to be criminals; so no wonder it is treating Syrian refugees like criminals”.



END





[1] Ghoul, who was a member of the MSP, broke with Bouguerra Soltani’s moderate islamist party when it opted to quit the government, essentially to be able to hold onto his ministerial position, subsequently founding the TAJ on no clear ideological basis.

[2] The position of Deputy Prime Minister that was created for him after he gave up the Interior portfolio in 2010 has now been abolished, its prerogatives never having been clearly defined.

[3] It is, however, worth noting that there are a couple of throwbacks to the early years of the Bouteflika presidency among the newly appointed ministers, notably the new Health Minister Abdelaziz Ziari and the new Housing Minister Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who both held various ministerial positions in the first years of Bouteflika’s presidency as well as serving as presidential advisors and/or diplomatic messengers.

[4] And, it might be added, Yazid Zerhouni.

[5] See AMSR #109, September 30, 2011.

[6] Movement of the Sons of the Sahara for Islamic Justice. An organisation going by a similar name was said to have been responsible for a handful of raids on oil companies in south-east Algeria in 2007, and possibly also for an attack against military aircraft on the tarmac at In Amenas airport in the same region, but had not been heard of since.

[7] Even though, according to El-Khabar, the Libyan document says French “experts” are there to train and aid Libyan forces. On September 3 the same newspaper said a “Western manned surveillance plane” crashed in the Hamada Hamra area in the Libyan desert, close to the border with Algeria. The crew “was immediately rescued by helicopters”. The newspaper did not say what country the aircraft or personnel belonged to.

[8] Shortly before the beginning of Ramadan, on August 1, police foiled what appears to have been an attempted vehicle-borne suicide bomb attack against the security headquarters of Khenchela (east).

[9] The very fact that the Defence Ministry issued a formal statement is unusual: the Algerian authorities generally do not report terrorist or security incidents officially and newspaper reports are usually attributed to “informed security sources”.