ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT
February 26, 2014
Executive Summary in FRENCH
ALGÉRIE : RAPPORT DE SITUATION MENSUEL
26 février 2014
Résumé
Les Tendances politiques
· PM Sellal a confirmé que le Président Bouteflika se présenterait aux élections en avril.
· Secrétaire Général du FLN Amar Saadani a fait une attaque franche sur le DRS et son commandant, Lieutenant-Général ‘Tewfik’ Médièn, déclenchant une guerre de mots acharnée dans les médias et encourageant la spéculation fiévreuse sur scissions au sommet de la structure du pouvoir.
· Le Président Bouteflika a cherché à mettre fin à cette controverse de plus en plus préjudiciable dans un long et anormalement franc discours lu en son nom à la télévision nationale, dans lequel il a réaffirmé sa confiance dans le DRS comme une partie intégrante et fidèle des forces armées.
· Il semble y avoir un froid dans les relations entre Tewfik et Bouteflika, datant de retour de Bouteflika de son hospitalisation prolongée en France juillet dernier, mais des sources concordantes indiquent que Tewfik ne s’oppose pas à la réélection de Bouteflika.
· Le discours de Bouteflika a également fait référence à une ordonnance de 2006 sur le statut du personnel militaire qui fixe des limites d’âge maximum pour les officiers supérieurs, et il semble qu’elle sera maintenant appliquée, ce qui augure un changement de génération au sein de l’armée et du DRS desquels Tewfik et chef d’état majeur Gaïd Saleh pourrait finalement se retirer.
· Des sources ont laissé entendre une nouvelle restructuration – et selon toute vraisemblance, un changement de nom – à la DRS, comme le service tente de se distancer de l’image désagréable qu’il a acquise dans les années 1990. Une source suggère que Washington pourrait avoir une carte à jouer dans ce domaine.
Relations étrangères
· Bien que les relations entre les deux pays restent très glacials, l’attitude publique des hauts responsables algériens envers le Maroc a en gros été remarquablement restreinte par rapport à la guerre de mots vicieuse qui a éclaté l’automne dernier.
· Toutefois, l’Algérie et le Maroc sont enfermés dans une lutte d’influence dans la cour de l’Algérie dans le Sahel, comme le Rabat cherche à combler le vide de leadership dans le groupe de pays CEN- SAD.
· La rivalité algéro-marocaine en ce moment focalise essentiellement sur le Mali, où les deux pays sont candidats pour le poste de «courtier honnête» entre le gouvernement central et les groupes rebelles du Nord.
· Après avoir suggéré que Rabat aide Washington dans l’établissement d’une zone de libre-échange américano-africain quand il a rencontré le Président Obama en novembre, le Roi Mohammed VI a entrepris une tournée africaine qui met en lumière les questions commerciales et économiques.
La Sécurité
· Bien qu’Alger reste calme, les zones de production pétrolières et gazières ont vu une poignée d’incidents – dont deux dans les environs d’In Amenas- la plupart du temps liés à la contrebande.
· La frontière de l’Algérie avec la Tunisie, en particulier son secteur nord, a vu une forte activité sur les deux côtés au cours des dernières semaines.
· Il y a des rapports que l’armée algérienne a bombardé des positions du Mouvement des Fils du Sahara dans le sud de la wilaya d’Illizi.
· Une « feuille de route » pour le succursale saharien de l’AQMI a refait surface sur les forums djihadistes ; il appelle à concentrer les attaques sur la France, l’Algérie et les intérêts occidentaux.
· Le groupe de Belmokhtar est dit d’avoir 20 kamikazes formés et prêt à frapper contre la France et ses alliés dans la région.
· Les plans pour une filiale Sonatrach totalement dédié à la sécurité semblent d’avoir été reportés, mais les employés de sociétés privées de sécurité exigent que leur situation soit traitée rapidement.
Political Trends
On Feb. 22 during a visit to Oran, Prime Minister Sellal finally broke the suspense and confirmed that President Bouteflika will be standing for re-election on April 17. Two days later, footage of the President receiving an envoy of the Emir of Kuwait was broadcast on state TV, in which he appeared somewhat livelier than in his previous TV appearance at the end of last year. But there was still no sound, and his message to mark the double anniversary of the founding of the UGTA trade union confederation and the nationalisation of Algeria’s oil and gas industry on Feb. 24 was distributed in text form by official news agency APS rather than being delivered as a speech by the head of state in person.
Sellal’s announcement of Bouteflika’s candidacy broke a suspense that had been growing, in a very real sense, unbearable for the regime itself, the tensions it had generated having given rise to an unprecedented round of public infighting between figures associated with different clans within the power structure. A close look at this extended episode is highly instructive.
Marking National Martyrs’ Day on Feb. 18, Veterans’ Affairs Minister Mohamed Cherif Abbas delivered a speech in the name President Bouteflika, the full text of which was subsequently issued by official news agency APS and, later, read out in toto during the evening news bulletin on state TV. Lasting a good 15 minutes, the President’s address paid only the briefest hommage to those who fell in the war of independence before launching into a long, stern and remarkably forthright appeal for an end to attacks in the media on the military and, in particular, the DRS, the powerful intelligence and security service headed by Lt-Gen. Mohamed ‘Tewfik’ Médiène. To get a sense of its extraordinary tenor, the speech is worth quoting at some length:
Thoughtless statements made by certain public figures, which have been amplified by commentary from all quarters, have provided the domestic and foreign media with grounds for comments and speculation that are detrimental to the unity of the National People’s Army.
Our adversaries, be they hidden or out in the open, have seized on this prejudicial situation to try to impose the idea that there is an internal conflict within the National People’s Army, casting the Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS) as a structure that acts in violation of the rules governing its duties and responsibilities.
[ … ]
The DRS must continue to perform its duties and responsibilities under the law. As part of the National People’s Army, the DRS carries out its tasks under the law and in accordance with the laws governing its activities. The point of these reminders is to reaffirm clearly that, contrary to the allegations and speculation reported by the press that are detrimental to the stability of the state and the National People’s Army, the DRS, like all other components of the National People’s Army, remains fully mobilized to fulfil its missions.
Given the tangible threats that Algeria now faces, in light of the current security situation on its borders, I ask all the officials concerned to take all necessary measures to restore the right degree of consultation and healthy cooperation at all levels and to ensure that every official and every structure should act in accordance with the regulations governing their activities, in the best interests of the nation.
[ … ]
Stirring up fictious conflicts between the structures of the National People’s Army is part of a process of destabilization that has been carefully prepared by those who are inconvenienced by Algeria’s influential position and its role in the region. [ … ]
Faced with this danger, which is quite perceptible, all officials must listen to their patriotic cons
cience and act to reduce all forms of tension that might arise between them. It is a question of the very future of the state, of its defence and security. The political and social context as the presidential election draws near – marked as it is by the confusion that has begun to spread throughout the media and the political scene, causing alarm among our fellow citizens under the influence of internal and external disinformation campaigns citing the supposed existence of conflicts between the highest institutions of the country, with serious consequences for Algeria’s security and stability – compels me to speak out and say what I have to say in order to put things in their proper perspective.
[ … ]
I ask all citizens, and especially those citizens who hold positions within the state, be they civilian or military, to realise what is at stake and to take action, each in his own position, in favour of consolidating stability and peace, which are the common property of all Algerians. Citizens who have the honor of serving the people, through the positions they hold, have a duty to rise to the level of responsibility that is required by the defence of the general interest.
[…]
The citizens should know that the national security apparatus, about which all kinds of remarks are being made, is governed by regulations that clearly define its tasks and responsibilities, both at the level of the state and within the Ministry of Defence.
In all countries, [the military] may be restructured when the need arises, as a matter of course. It is in this spirit that I decided, in 2006, to restructure the national security apparatus. When implemented in other countries, restructuring does not give rise to any alarmist and subjective commentary. In Algeria, some people, with their subjective and malicious reading of the facts, try to present such restructuring as proof that there is a crisis within the state or within the Ministry of Defence.
While the evocation of foreign plots against Algeria may be a hackneyed trope, the rest of Bouteflika’s speech is highly unusual, not to say unprecedented, in its direct and explicit allusions to the DRS and its grave warnings to “civilian and military officials” to cease and desist from infighting that risks putting in jeopardy the unity and stability of the state.
This extraordinary speech comes in response to an equally extraordinary exchange of salvoes over the past months, which has escalated alarmingly in recent weeks:
– The escalation appears to have been sparked by Amar Saadani, a controversial figure ever since he took over as General Secretary of the FLN at the beginning of September[1] and, especially, since his Reuters interview the following month in which he claimed that Bouteflika, of whom he is an ardent supporter, was planning to introduce reforms once re-elected that would put an end to interference by the DRS in politics. On Feb. 3, Saadani gave an interview to Franco-Algerian news portal TSA, in which he returned to the same theme with a vengeance: attempts by his opponents within the FLN to unseat him were being piloted by the DRS under direct orders from Tewfik, he claimed, adding that Tewfik “ought to have resigned” long ago, given the intelligence and security service’s record of “failures”[2]; the DRS was also responsible, he claimed, for spreading “rumours and lies” about the involvement of figures such as President Bouteflika’s brother and advisor Saïd or former Energy Minister Chakib Khelil in corruption, warning darkly that “if something bad happens to me, it will be Tewfik’s doing”.
– Saadani’s remarks immediately drew an astounding barrage of criticism, with most Algerian newspapers rushing to defend Tewfik and many not hesitating to attack Saadani personally: the most lurid example being Le Jeune Indépendent, which ran photos of the FLN General Secretary and the DRS commander side by side on its front page, under the banner headline “When A Homo Attacks A Man”[3]. Former Justice Minister Mohamed Cherfaoui, for his part, penned a lengthy open letter to Saadani published by El Watan, taking him to task for casting aspersions on the probity of the armed forces, the DRS and the criminal justice system, and revealing that Saadani himself had approached him when he was still Justice Minister to ask him “as a friend” to see to it that the courts would not bother Chakib Khelil when looking into the “Sonatrach II” corruption scandal.
– Meawhile, leading Arabic-language daily El Khabar claimed to have learnt from unnamed security sources that Bouteflika was preparing to push Tewfik into retirement, along with at least 100 other officers belong to the DRS and various branches of the military. Although El Khabar did not labour the point, other media were swift to conclude that this was because Tewfik had (as Saadani had insinuated) opposed the idea of Bouteflika standing for a fourth consecutive term of office. Within days, media of all stripes were reporting that Chief of Staff Lt-Gen. Gaïd Saleh had deliberately snubbed Tewfik at the mid-January meeting of the Special Security Commission that approved the retirement of as many as 83 officers, including up to 50 from the DRS alone – among them, it would seem, the head of the DRS’s Groupe d’Intervention Spéciale, Gen. Hacène. On Feb. 8, the story broke that Gen. Hacène had been placed under judicial supervision or even arrested, with each newspaper and website advancing its own version of the reasons – retention of sensistive documents after leaving his post, the mishandling of the Tiguentourine siege, or even (in the most alarmist version published by Algérie Express[4]) hoarding weapons and establishing “an armed organisation”.
– In the midst of all this, former DRS agent and newspaper editor Hicham Aboud, who stirred controversy last year by publishing a series of “scoops” on President Bouteflika’s state of health and prospects for recovery during his hospitalisation in France, penned a letter to Saïd Bouteflika accusing him at length and in detail of being involved in various cases of corruption[5]. Aboud’s letter, supposedly sent to the President’s brother as part of a “fact-checking” exercise in preparation for a book on the Bouteflika clan, was published in facsimile by TSA on Feb. 9. Barely had Saïd Bouteflika had the time to state his intention of suing Aboud for libel when he came under attack from another quarter: on Feb. 11, El Watan and Al-Khabar simultaneously published, respectively in French and in Arabic, an interview with Gen. Hocine Benhadid (rtd.)[6] accusing Saïd of “running the country by telephone from the Presidency”, with the DRS as his “sole adversary”. Tewfik, Gen. Benhadid argued, is “Algeria’s last rampart, without whom the country will go under”. Claiming to speak on behalf of many serving officers who are unable to speak out publicly, Benhadid reserved most of his venom for Chief of Staff Gaïd Saleh, who, he argued, “completely lacks credibility and is liked by nobody within the army” and was responsible for needlessly “provoking” Tewfik. Amar Saadani and others who have attacked Tewfik and the DRS, Benhadid insinuated, had been put up to it by Saïd Bouteflika and/or Gaïd Saleh.
– In a first effort to call time-out, a letter from Bouteflika to Gaïd Saleh presenting condolences after the crash of an Algerian Air Force aircraft carrying the families of servicemen based in the far south of the country, was read on national television on Feb. 11: “Accustomed as we may have become to excesses from some quarters at the approach of each election, this time the vicious attacks have reached a level that our country has never seen since independence, going as far as to try to undermine the unity of the Army […] No one, irrespective of his responsibilities, is entitled to attack the National People’s Army or other constitutional institutions,” warned the President. The following day, Abdelmadjid Sidi-Saïd,
General Secretary of the UGTA (the powerful official trade union confederation), issued a communiqué condemning Amar Saadani’s attacks on the DRS – conveniently forgetting that Saadani, himself a former trade unionist, had been decorated by the UGTA last October shortly after he had taken over at the head of the FLN.
For those with long memories, this outpouring is in some respects reminiscent of the period preceding the presidential election of 2004, when the Algerian independent press was awash with negative reporting – some of it fabrication, some of it grounded in the truth – on the behind-the-scenes activities of the Bouteflika clan (with Saïd Bouteflika’s name already cropping up in relation to stiffled corruption scandals). This extremely ugly press campaign was conducted mainly by journalists close to or manipulated by sections of the military and the DRS, as the army chiefs led by then Chief of Staff Lt-Gen Mohamed Lamari sought to get rid of Bouteflika, with whom they had grown exasperated, through the ballot box[7]. But whereas in 2004 the brickbats were hurled in one direction alone, with Bouteflika unable or unwilling to hit back at the military chiefs via the media, this time round there has been an unprecedented multidirectional free-fire shoot-out. Members of one and the same camp have been taking pot-shots at one another (Saadani and Sidi Saïd, for example, are both vocal supporters of a fourth term for Bouteflika) and, more importantly, the core institutions of the state – the DRS and the Army – have begun to take hits.
What lies behind this unedifying spectacle? The testimony of three private sources, each with differing perspectives and differing degrees of access to the Presidency and the DRS, seems to suggest that there has indeed been at least a partial breakdown in relations between key players at the top of the state, albeit not in the dramatic form claimed by some of the more alarmist press reports:
– A civil servant at the Presidency argues that Amar Saadani’s declarations “should not be taken seriously”. Saadani was “acting on orders from Saïd Bouteflika”, and the aim of the whole episode was to send a message to the FLN dissidents, led by Abderrahmane Belayat, “to the effect that Saadani and his mentor, Saïd Bouteflika, were not afraid of the DRS,” to which Belayat had appealed for support. Saïd, continues the same source, “is bent on keeping his brother on as President, even if he is confined to a hospital bed. It is Saïd who has done everything to minimise the effects and consequences of the two Sonatrach corruption scandals. One of his friends told him at the end of January that the DRS would not drop the cases until it has shown him to be up to his neck in corruption at Sonatrach. Saïd, who was drunk at the time, launched into a tirade of insults and threats against Tewfik, attaching obscenities to his name every time he was mentioned”. As for Bouteflika’s letter to Gaïd Saleh[8], responding to Saadani’s attacks on Tewfik, it was intended to show that the President is not an adversary of Tewfik or the DRS and that the changes that were made at the DRS last September were necessary and carried out with Gen. Tewfik’s consent.
– On the other hand, a source who is close to the middle ranks of the DRS and has many years’ experience of the way in which the Algerian military and intelligence services operate, claims that Saadani “is being used by Gaïd Saleh against Tewfik”. In the same way, Gaïd Saleh has also instrumentalised the case of Gen. Hacène in order to damage Tewfik. This, the source argues, has occurred in the context of a tug-of-war between the clans, over whether Bouteflika should stand for a fourth term or whether the power structure should find an alternative candidate. There would have been consensus, in the name of stability and continuity, in favour of Bouteflika standing again had he not suffered his stroke in April of last year, but “now the army is split in two, between those who support Gaïd Saleh and a fourth term of office for Bouteflika, and those who are opposed to both. The DRS is for the most part opposed to a fourth term, but not Tewfik. Tewfik’s big mistake was to enter into contact with Ali Benflis and other potential replacement candidates[9] while Bouteflika was in hospital in France”. The source suggests that what is really at stake in the tug-of-war between competing factions is the nature and extent of the guarantees that can be given to those who have acquired wealth and power under Bouteflika, and even what guarantees can be given with regard to Bouteflika’s place in history.
– Speaking to us on the day of Saadani’s fateful TSA interview, a presidential staffer close to Bouteflika claimed that the FLN General Secretary had lashed out at Tewfik because he knew he was about to be ditched and his predecessor Abdelaziz Belkhadem brought back to replace him. “Saadani thinks Tewfik is behind this, but in fact it is what Bouteflika wants,” claimed the source, who a week later, as the polemics raged in the press, assured us blithely that “nothing serious” was going on – “only belly dancing”. However, the same source had slightly earlier shed interesting light on the state of relations at the top. After Bouteflika’s return from his hospitalisation in Paris last September, the head of the national police force Gen. Abdelghani Hamel “maliciously” told the President that Tewfik had been making disparaging remarks about him in his absence, claims the source, leading to a cooling in relations between Bouteflika and Tewfik that lasts to this day. This should not affect Bouteflika’s plans to run for a fourth term, argues the source, who suggested that Tewfik would not attempt to stand in his way, preferring to continue to act as a “faithful servant of the state”. Gaïd Saleh, meanwhile is totally subservient to Bouteflika. The President will go ahead and run for a fourth term, and is physically up to it[10]. The “only problem is Saïd, who filters everything, so everything the President hears comes via his brother”.
While the sources – all of whom spoke to us before Sellal confirmed Bouteflika’s candidacy – may differ in their evaluation of the President’s present state of health and readiness to run for re-election, the overall picture which emerges is that the brain haemorrhage that he suffered in April of last year did provoke doubts and misunderstandings, at least for a time, and ultimately caused damage to the trust between Bouteflika and Tewfik. Nonetheless, the DRS chief himself does not seem to be opposed to Bouteflika’s re-election (and indeed the presidential staffer seemed to suggest that the rift between the two may ultimately prove repairable). However, the President’s stroke also seems to have led to a situation in which the influence of his brother Saïd has grown considerably, while Chief of Staff Gaïd Saleh appears to have drawn very close to Bouteflika, and this situation appears to be making the situation even more difficult for Tewfik.
Beyond this, it is also worth dwelling on Bouteflika’s somewhat obscure reference in his Martyrs’ Day speech to a “restructuring of the national security apparatus” he supposedly ordered “in 2006”. This appears to refer to a document signed into law by Bouteflika in early 2006, Ordinance 06-02 of Feb. 28 2006 on the general status of military personnel, which, amongst other things, sets maximum age limits and maximum numbers of years of service for various ranks (the top age limit for a lieutenant-general, the highest rank in the military, held by both Tewfik and Gaïd Saleh, is in principle 64; for a major-general, 60; and for a general, 56). The ordinance does go on to stipulate that “a waiver of [the maximum] age [limit] may be granted by the President of the Republic to generals and senior officers occupying senior positions in the military hierarchy”, and it would seem that this has been fairly extensively used over the past few years (both Ga
ïd Saleh and Tewfik, to name but them, are 74 years old), but reports of a wave of retirements being approved at the January meeting of the Special Security Commission suggest that this may no longer be the case. This conclusion is borne out by the source close to the middle ranks of the DRS quoted above, who tells us that “there are big changes ahead in the DRS and the armed forces, if only for ‘biological’ reasons, because like Bouteflika, Tewfik and Gaïd Saleh are getting old and will have to go soon”[11].
But in addition to this generational shift – which itself is likely to extend farther than just the two most senior officers in the military and security services – further restructuring of the DRS would appear to be in the works. Both the source close to mid-ranking DRS officers and the presidential staffer have intimated that, at very least, the intelligence and security service is likely to be renamed in the not-too-distant future, and may possibly undergo additional, more substantive organisational changes as well. The former suggests that such changes are being made because Tewfik and the DRS as a whole want to turn the page on the legacy of the 1990s, when the intelligence and security service was “over-exposed”, while the latter claims that the reorganisation of the DRS comes at least partly in response to pressure from US – two visions which need not, in fact, be considered antinomical.
Foreign Relations
Despite the latent tension that persists in Algerian-Moroccan relations, senior Algerian officials, no doubt preoccupied by more pressing dangers to the east and south, have by and large shown a surprising degree of restraint vis à vis their western neighbour over the past two to three months – especially when set against the virulent war of words that flared, after months of steady deterioration in relations, in October and November of last year.
To be sure, Prime Minister Sellal – never the most careful of speakers – did lash out in mid-December during a public meeting in Tlemcen, claiming that the Algerian authorities had “irrefutable proof” that Moroccan drug money was being used to finance terrorist cells in Tunisia[12]. But this aside, Algerian government representatives have generally tended to ignore or downplay potential occasions for a new flare-up: Algerian Foreign Ministry spokesmen reacted philosophically to reports in December that Morocco was to build a barbed-wire fence along the border, from Saïdia in the north to Figuig, arguing that that would be Morocco’s business as long as construction was limited to uncontested Moroccan territory; the very lenient treatment by the Moroccan courts of the ‘Royalist Youth’ member who tore down the Algerian flag at Algeria’s consulate in Casablanca on Nov. 1 drew no official comment whatsoever; a group of Syrian refugees that the Moroccan authorities had reportedly attempted to expel via the closed border with Algeria at the end of January were refused access by Algerian border guards, but there was no attempt to make political capital out of the incident; revelations in the French media[13] that Rabat bought two French-made Pléiade spy satellites in 2013 at a cost of €500m passed without comment from Algiers; and even a potentially serious incident on Feb. 17, when according to Rabat Algerian soldiers fired shots towards a Moroccan border observation post at Aït Jomrane near Figuig, seems to have fizzled out after a brief exchange of self-righteous communiqués[14].
There is no denying, however, that relations remain extremely frosty. Bilateral political contacts appear to be effectively frozen, and by some accounts Algiers has resolved to boycott all international gatherings in Morocco as well[15]. Furthermore, the two neighbours are increasingly deeply involved in a battle for influence in sub-Saharan Africa generally, and in Algeria’s backyard in the Sahel in particular. Since 2012, Morocco has quietly been trying to fill the leadership vacuum in the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) left by the overthrow of Libya’s Col. Qaddafi[16], hosting a summit of the regional grouping in October of last year. More recently, Morocco’s Assistant Foreign Minister Mbarka Bouaida (who happens to be of Saharawi origin) held fresh talks with the General Secretary of CEN-SAD during the last week of January in Addis Abeba, where she had been sent to conduct informal meetings with delegations attending the 22nd summit of the African Union (of which, of course, Morocco is not a member).
Mbarka Bouaida’s highest-level contact while in Addis Abeba, however, was with Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. The Malian head of state is now being actively courted by both Morocco and Algeria – he was received by President Bouteflika in Algiers on Jan. 19 – as they compete for the role of mediator in the north Mali conflict. In this, Algiers’ efforts appear to be floundering of late: Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra’s attempts to reconcile Tuareg, Arab and other factions of northern Mali as a prelude to talks between the Malian government and northern rebel movements that are supposed to be held under the terms of the Ouagadougou agreement of June 2013 effectively collapsed in January, with the Tuareg MNLA refusing to send a delegation to a round table that was planned in Algiers and most other groups changing their minds at the last minute. Morocco, on the other hand, has been making noticeable headway: the MNLA has officially requested King Mohamed VI’s good offices in the quest for a lasting solution in northern Mali, and sent its General Secretary Bilal Ag Cherif to Marrakesh for an audience with the Moroccan monarch on Jan. 31. In response, Algeria is reported to have unceremoniously bundled another leading member of the MNLA, Akli Iknan Ag Suleiman, who was in Algiers for medical treatment onto a plane for Ouagadougou.
Driving home Morocco’s advantage, Mohamed VI this month embarked on another tour of French-speaking countries of sub-Saharan Africa, taking him first to Mali and then on to Guinée, Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon. Chiming with the Moroccan King’s suggestion during his meeting with President Obama in Washington last November that the United States and Morocco work together towards creating a new US-Africa free-trade zone, the focus of his latest African tour was essentially economic: no fewer than 17 bilateral economic cooperation agreements were signed while he was in Bamako, and similar initiatives were expected in the other capitals on his schedule.
As noted in earlier reports, career diplomat Ramtane Lamamra appears to have been chosen as Foreign Minister when the government was reshuffled last September largely because of his years of experience as an Africa specialist (and as it happens, on Feb. 19, even as Mohamed VI began his latest African tour, Lamamra was on his way to Niger). But even with the savvy Lamamra at the helm, it is beginning to look uncertain that Algerian diplomacy in Africa will be able to match Rabat’s all-out efforts south of the Sahara – not least because President Bouteflika would appear to be physically unable to devote the kind of personal attention King Mohamed VI has been giving to courting African governments.
Security
Taking the month as a whole, the level of jihadist activity in January was comparable to that in December, with 14 reported incidents over all (against 13 in December), though the number of operations initiated by AQMI or other jihadist groups dropped from six in December to only three in January. So far in February (up to Feb. 19) three jihadist operations were recorded out of a total of six security incidents (which include jihadist operations plus security forces operations).
ALGIERS and its surrounding area were quiet. AQMI’s stronghold in Kabylia and the western parts of the wilaya of Bouira was also largely quiet over this reporting period (Jan. 19-Feb. 19), with only one operation report
ed: a remote controlled bomb that killed one soldier and wounded three civilians in the town on Bordj Menaiel, wilaya of Boumerdès, on February 3.
It was the EASTERN BORDERS, and in particular the border with Tunisia, that saw the heaviest action:
– Algerian Arabic-language daily Echorouk (22/01) and others quoted security sources as saying the commander of the 5th military region was in the eastern border zone to oversee a search and destroy mission in the Beni Salah mountains, wilaya of El Tarf, looking for 16 jihadists who were believed to have sneaked in from Tunisia’s Djebel Chaambi region. TSA (20/01) said the operation was launched after a Tunisian national, believed to belong to the group, was arrested in the neighbouring wilaya of Guelma a few days earlier. Later press reports indicated that the army engaged the 16-strong jihadist group from Tunisia near Aïn Karma, wilaya of El-Tarf, on Jan. 23-26, killing seven of them.
– Echorouk (10/02) reported that the army had killed another two jihadists in the wilaya of El Tarf “in the areas near the border with Tunisia” on February 8.
– On February 14 security forces arrested two jihadists, believed to have come from Tunisia, in the area between the wilayas of El Tarf and Guelma.
– The Tunisian press reported Feb. 3 that Algerian and Tunisian security forces had “foiled a terrorist plot to attack vital public interests in Tunisia and security positions on both sides of the border area with Algeria”.
– On February 16, a group of four armed men, wearing Tunisian security forces uniforms, attacked a Tunisian security patrol near the town of Djendouba, close to the border with Algeria, killing two soldiers and two civilians and wounding others. Witnesses said two of the attackers “spoke with an Algerian accent”. As the Tunisian press was swift to point out, their tactic of setting up a fake checkpoint is a classic technique of AQMI and other jihadist groups in Algeria.
Two incidents were reported on the SOUTHERN BORDERS:
– The Algerian Defence Ministry announced on February 7 that security forces in the Bordj Baji Mokhtar area had “captured a major consignment of weapons near the town on February 5”. The seizure included “a machine gun, a Kalashnikov assault rifle, two Simonov semi-automatic rifles, and a significant load of ammunition of different calibres.” There was no indication as to how, or exactly where, the weapons were seized.
– The army, acting on information, ambushed a jihadist group near Bordj Baji Mokhtar, on the border with Mali, around February 10-11. The jihadists were travelling on five offroaders when the army forces intercepted them and chased them for three hours, killing six. The rest fled towards Khelil, in Mali.
Three incidents were reported in the OIL & GAS PRODUCING REGIONS of the south, two of them close to In Amenas:
– News portal Algérie 1 quoted local security sources as saying that an attempted attack on an ENAGEO worksite “between In Amenas and Illizi, not far from the Libyan border” was repulsed by the “elements in charge of securing the site” on January 20. The assailants, who were believed to be linked to “criminal networks” (as opposed to any openly jihadist organisation), are reported to have taken a number of 4WD vehicles and lorries before disappearing into the desert. No deaths or serious injuries were reported.
– On February 7, according to El Khabar (Feb. 8) a convoy of security forces vehicles “came under heavy machine gun fire” from an armed group near In Amenas. The soldiers riposted and repelled the attackers, suffering no losses. It is believed the assailants were a group of smugglers that wanted to seize the soldiers’ offroaders.
– Security forces on January 18 “seized a major arsenal” in a cache near In Amguel, just south of In Salah, wilaya of Tamanrasset, including “20 machine guns, more than 15 RPGs and 10 anti-aircraft missiles”. It is believed the weapons were hidden there by smugglers.
Also in the far south, the Sons of the Sahara Movement for Islamic Justice (which in early January announced its merger with a hitherto unknown group calling itself the Free Tuareg Group and pledged to “keep fighting the Algerian army until their demands are met”) issued another statement around January 20 claiming its positions in the Tassili n’Ajjer mountains, wilaya of Illizi, had been bombed by Algerian warplanes in what it described as “the beginning of military operations against the Movement”. The statement went on to affirm that “our weapons are only to defend ourselves and are not directed against anyone” and that the movement would continue its “struggle for justice and full and equal citizenship rights for the Algerian south”. This statement appeared on social media and blogs, and the incident itself was not reported in any mainstream media, although on January 26 the elbark.com website reported that the Sons of the Sahara Movement “had broken the truce it reached with the Algerian authorities and taken up arms, claiming that its demands — justice for the Algerian south — have not been met”. El Watan (07/02) reported on a demonstration by a few dozen people in Djanet, wilaya of Illizi, on February 2 calling for “an immediate end to military operations in Tassili n’Ajjer” and for dialogue with Abdessalam Tarmoune, the movement’s leader[17].
Meanwhile, beyond Algeria’s borders, a purported “roadmap” of AQMI in the Sahara, supposedly “issued between November and January”, has been circulating on jihadist forums, detailing the strategy of priorities of Yahia Abou El Hamam (Djamel Okacha), emir of AQMI’s Sahara branch. The document suggests that the group intends to focus its attacks chiefly on “the most dangerous foes”, namely the French and “their Algerian allies”, with the Malian army and its local allies in second place. UN and African forces, seen as weak and ineffective, are not considered a priority target. While escalating attacks against the French “at the time when the French decided to withdraw”, the group is also said to be plotting a big operation “to shake Bamako”, targeting, if possible, Western interests, including embassies. At the same time, the document talks of the need to “broaden the scope” of its operations to including Western interests in Algeria and Tunisia and other countries in the region.
At the same time, the Tamanrasset-based CEMOC (Comité d’état-major opérationnel — joint military committee of Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania) is reported to have issued an alert concerning Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s Al Mourabitoun organisation, naming some 20 individuals of various nationalities[18] who have allegedly been trained and prepared for suicide operations. According to Algerian daily El Watan, “interrogations of terrorists arrested in Algeria and information gathered by Algerian, Malian and French intelligence agencies in northern Mali” revealed that Al Mourabitoun is planning to deploy the “group of martyrs” for a large-scale attack against the interests of France or its allies in one of the four CEMOC countries, to be dubbed “Operation Vengeance for the Martyrs Abderrahmane El Nigiri[19] and Abou Zeïd[20]”.
As for plans to establish a Sonatrach subsidiary wholly focussed on security for the oil and gas industry, a source at the Presidency, speaking to us in mid-February, confirms these have been postponed:
Discussions about the creation of a subsidiary for Sonatrach’s security arrangements have been suspended at the Presidency, and that is also the case at the Ministry of Energy and Sonatrach. The decision to suspend discussions, which is provisional, has been taken because there are more important priorities: securing the borders with Tunisia and Libya, which is drawing heavily on army, gendarmerie and DRS personnel; the presidential election i
n April, etc. However, there are certain pressure groups, within the UGTA and Sonatrach, that are campaigning for a shorter timetable for the creation of this security subsidiary. The demonstrations by employees of private security companies in Oran on Feb. 9 and 10[21] are part of this, and oil industry trade unionists have handed out leaflets on the subject in Hassi Messaoud.
END
Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel, Ret.
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com
From: Peter Cross [mailto:peter.cross@tacticalstudies.eu]
Sent: Thursday, February 27, 2014 9:25 AM
To: Edward Gabriel; Fatima Kurtz; Jean AbiNader; Bob Holley; Jordan Paul
Subject: AMSR etc
Our latest AMSR attached.
Notwithstanding our observation in this month’s AMSR that Algerian government officials have been relatively restrained in their comments re Morocco over the past couple of months, there is a spot of unpleasantness brewing as a result of Rabat’s current spat with France, with suggestions in the Moroccan press that the whole affair (and in particular the serving of writs for torture against DGST commander Abdellatif Hammouchi while in France) is the result of dirty tricks by a supposed ‘Algerian lobby’ in France.
You may also be interested in the following, from Moroccan newsmagazine Tel Quel, summarising Eliza Barlcay and Kirsten Chick’s piece published by Foreign Policy earlier this week.
Rgds
PC
Les secrets du lobbying marocain aux Etats Unis dévoilés
Tel Quel
27/02/14
Le site américain spécialisé en relations internationales , Foreign Policy (FP), a publié, le mercredi 26 février, un article dans lequel une analyse du lobbying marocain aux Etats-Unis est effectuée. De grandes sommes ont été dépensées par le royaume en vue de s’assurer le soutien des Etats-Unis sur le dossier du Sahara. Un lobbying qui se révèle être efficace.
Le Maroc a dépensé plus de 20 millions de dollars en lobbying
20 millions de dollars ont été dépensés par le royaume depuis 2007 pour faire du lobbying si l’on en croit les données du gouvernement américain. Le Maroc aurait d’ailleurs employé les services de plus de neuf compagnies de lobbying durant cette période. En 2009, le royaume a dépensé plus d’argent que tous les pays arabes, et deux fois plus que l’Egypte.
La firme Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP) est la plus sollicitée, 13,7 millions de dollars lui ont été versés par le Maroc. Les diplomates américains, passés par le Maroc, sont également sollicités. Exemple, la firme de l’ancien ambassadeur américain au royaume, Edward Gabriel, a reçu plus de 3,7 millions de dollars depuis 2002.
Le Maroc domine la guerre du lobbying
Le Maroc domine largement l’Algérie, principal soutien au Polisario, en termes de lobbying. Depuis 2007, celle-ci a dépensé « 2,4 millions de dollars pour le lobbying ». Une maigre somme comparée aux 20 millions dépensés par le royaume durant la même période. Le front Polisario a, quant à lui, dépensé 42 433 dollars dans ce domaine depuis 2009.
Le lobbying marocain semble être plutôt efficace. En effet, une proposition de loi a été soumise au congrès américain, qui stipule que le département d’état américain (ndlr : l’équivalent du ministère des affaires étrangères) « doit établir un projet en vue de résoudre cette longue dispute avec le Sahara Occidental basé sur le plan d’autonomie sous souveraineté »
Autre illustration de l’efficacité du lobbying marocain, l’annulation du projet américain d’ajout de la composante des droits de l’homme a la MINURSO et celle de l’opération militaire conjointe Desert Lion. La rencontre entre Obama et Mohammed VI, en novembre dernier, est également mentionnée. A l’issue de celle-ci, le président Obama avait qualifié la solution marocaine au conflit de « sérieuse, réaliste et crédible ».
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[1] His opponents within the FLN, led by Abderrahmane Belayat, claim to have mustered the support of the two thirds of the members of the party’s central committee necessary for a meeting of the party’s ruling body to be convened without the General Secretary’s consent, in an effort to unseat him, but have so far failed to receive authorisation from the authorities in Algiers to proceed with the meeting.
[2] Saadani listed the assassination of President Boudiaf in 1992, the abduction and murder of seven French monks from the Tibehrine monastery in 1996, the assassination of UGTA General Secretary Abdelhak Benhamouda in 1997, the suicide bombings against the Palais du Gouvernement and other targets in central Algiers in 2007, the failed assassination attempt against President Bouteflika in Batna later the same year, and the Tiguentourine attack in Jan. 2013.
[3] A reference to scurrilous rumours spread by another daily, Algérie Patriotique, which is co-owned by the sons of Tewfik and former Defence Minister and Chief of Staff Gen. Khaled Nezzar, to the effect that Saadani had in his youth worked as a transvestite belly dancer.
[4] A news portal close to the opposition RCD party.
[5] Taking a page out of Algérie Patriotique’s book, Aboud also invites Saïd Bouteflika to confirm that he is homosexual.
[6] Former commander of the Algerian army’s 8th armoured brigade and then of the 3rd military region, Benhadid was a protégé of President Liamine Zeroual and his poweful security advisor Mohamed Betchine in the 1990s. Having already taken retirement, Benhadid openly supported the candidacy of Ali Benflis against Bouteflika in the 2004 presidential election.
[7] A plan that was scuppered by a last minute deal between Bouteflika and Tewfik, enabling the President and his Interior Minister, Yazid Zerhouni, to orchestrate a landslide victory. Humiliated by the experience, CoS Lamari subsequently resigned, and the most harmful press attacks on Bouteflika and his ‘clan’ largely ceased.
[8] The source was speaking before Bouteflika’s Martyrs’ Day speech.
[9] Former Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia was summoned for an audience with Tewfik in July, the day after Bouteflika’s return from his extended stay in France. The news was duly leaked by Algérie Patriotique (of which Tewfik’s own son is co-owner), in what one usually astute source suggested at the time was a deliberate hint that the head of the DRS had bestowed his blessing on the former PM. At the same time, there were suggestions that Ali Benflis was waiting for the nod from the top brass, although there were no reports in the media of any meetings between him and Tewfik.
[10] A leader of a Tunisian political party, who visited Bouteflika in Algiers at the beginning of February, was also very upbeat about his health, reporting that he greeted him standing up, showed no sign of any particular deterioration in his physical condition and appeared as mentally alert as ever. The source came away from the meeting “convinced that Bouteflika will run for a fourth term – which suits Tunisia and Libya very well, even if the Moroccans would rather see someone more flexible”. Note however that the source is a personal friend of Bouteflika’s of many years standing, a factor which might conceivably affect his testimony.
[11] The source suggests Gaïd Saleh will be the first to go, perhaps as early as June of this year.
[12] Echoing SADR Prime Minister Abdelkader Taleb Oumar, who alleged in a speech on Dec. 8 that “the SADR has evidence of Morocco’s support for terrorism and crimina
l groups in the region in order to destabilize and thus hinder the process of solving the Saharawi question in accordance with the principles and resolutions of the United Nations on decolonization. [The SADR’s army, gendarmerie and police] are mobilized to fight against all forms of terrorism and crime supported by Morocco, including the trafficking of narcotics produced in the Kingdom of Morocco.”
[13] La Tribune, 03/02/14: ‘Armement : la France a vendu deux satellites espions au Maroc en 2013’
[14] The allegations were first made in a Moroccan Interior Ministry communiqué on Feb. 17, followed by a Foreign Ministry statement announcing that Morocco’s ambassador in Algiers had “entered into contact with the competent authorities” to protest. The following day, Algerian Foreign Ministry spokesman Amar Belani denied that there had been any communication from the Moroccan ambassador and wondered out loud about the “motives behind the mediatisation of démarches that never took place”. Belani stopped short of denying outright that any shooting had occurred, however, while Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra, questioned at a press conference, seemed to imply that the Algerian forces may have opened fire on “drug traffickers, smugglers or illegal migrants”.
[15] Furthermore, Morocco’s official news agency MAP was swift to detect Algiers’ hand in the decision prevent a Moroccan delegation from taking part in a three-day workshop jointly organised by the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (of which Morocco is a member) and the African Union’s Center on the Study and Research on Terrorism (CSRT) in Algiers as of February 4. The Algerian Foreign Ministry denied any hand in the matter, insisting that the decision was made by the CSRT on the grounds that Morocco is not a member of the AU.
[16] Qaddafi was instrumental in establishing CEN-SAD in the late 1990s, and provided the bulk of its funding. Irked by Qaddafi’s hegemonic tendencies, Algeria – alone among the states of the region – stayed out, but Morocco joined as of 2001. In June 2012, Rabat hosted a meeting of CEN-SAD aimed at reviving the recently orphaned organisation.
[17] Tarmoune is reported to have taken over the leadership of the Sons of the Sahara, which has contacts with Belmokhtar’s Al-Mourabitoun, after the death of Lamine Bencheneb in the In Amenas attack in January, and to be seconded by the latter’s brother, Youssef Bencheneb. In September, there were hints in the press that the DRS had been negotiating with Illizi notables and local youth who were in contact with the group to persuade the Sons of the Sahara to lay down their arms.
[18] Nine Malians, four Mauritanians, three Algerians, two Tunisians, one Egyptian and one Nigerian.
[19] Killed in the raid on the Tiguentourine gas facility in January 2013.
[20] The former leader of AQMI’s Saharan branch, killed by French forces in northern Mali in February 2013.
[21] Security guards working for 2SP security firm held a sit-in before Sonatrach Downstream headquarters in Oran on February 9, calling for pay and conditions on a par their colleagues working for Sonatrach itself, according to reports in the Algerian press. Their representatives threatened to hold further protests every Sunday if their demands were not addressed, and the movement appears to be continuing: around 100 2SP personnel held another sit-in in front of the Sonatrach Downstream HQ on Feb. 16, according to Le Quotidien d’Oran (February 17).
