The intelligence services of neighboring countries are particularly active in the course of critical activities of nations with which they share borders because Spanish decisions, in this case, affect them in some way.
Recent events reported by the media, and probably very true, about espionage and attempts to recruit Intelligence officers from the CNI by members of the CIA stationed in Spain, give us an idea of why our National Security Law makes reference to espionage as a significant part of the risks and threats to anticipate and counteract.
The issue would not be novel either with any other intelligence service, that is, those that maintain a continuous interest in Spain and « observe » it, to use diplomatic language, in the sense that Spanish decisions in general (political, economic, social, strategic, etc.) or military realms may affect them in some way.
We have in mind Morocco and Algeria due to Spain’s longstanding equidistance in the inter-Maghreb conflict, currently broken by our decisions on the sovereignty of the former Spanish Sahara, and perhaps now Israel due to Spain’s recent stance on the Gaza war during the EU Presidency. Even distant powers outside the primary circle of Spanish interest, such as Iran in this case, as indicated by the recent attack on a Spanish politician during an ongoing investigation.
In another vein, the intelligence services of neighboring countries are particularly active in the course of critical activities of nations with which they share borders because Spanish decisions, in this case, affect them in some way.
France’s interest in the progress of the separatist movements in Spain, both Basque and Catalan, is evident. Their intelligence services are dedicated to these aspects because there is a Northern Basque Country (Iparralde) that separatists count in Spain as the future fifth Basque territory, in addition to Navarra. Similarly, there is a Northern Catalonia with certain ideological ties, enough to attract the attention of French services. It’s worth mentioning that France avoids any legislative concession to its risk-prone territories, not administratively delineated based on ethnicity and language, and requires the use of French in institutional debates. It’s also crucial for French intelligence services to note that their current Constitution (Fifth Republic 1958) clearly prohibits the secession of territories.
One could continue analyzing different parts of the world and highlighting countries or collective institutions that are particularly interesting for intelligence services. The conclusion might be that each country or specific area has, to a greater or lesser extent, interests that clash with ours, or at least do not coincide. As an initial conclusion, one could admit that you can be an ally, in NATO and the EU, share common treaty objectives, even have top leaders of each member country be « friends, » and agree on the fundamentals. However, intelligence services can never be labeled as friends because national objectives, however close they may seem to the common interest and the letter of the agreements, will always differ.
In the case serving as the introduction to the article, the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence service of the United States, have been active in Spain for many years. It is indeed an allied service with which a protocol of action is maintained, outlining common objectives and actions. Necessary contacts are established in Madrid and Washington, accredited personnel from each side are accepted, meeting the conditions set by the Vienna Convention, and these agreements are sealed with the signatures of the top officials of both services who visit and contact each other at the highest level.
Any other action not foreseen in these meticulously supervised protocols in each intelligence service is illegal. Espionage outside the agreements is a crime, so those responsible, immune to the action of the Justice of the receiving country under the aforementioned convention, must leave the country due to their non-compliance.
This aspect is logically similar to the activities of Spanish Intelligence members in the United States, reciprocally. However, it is essential to emphasize that if the United States intended to have a « special insight » into the Spanish national-level service, it was because they were interested in an exclusive matter not covered by the exchanges.
In any case, infiltrating the interior of another country’s intelligence service is one of the objectives of any self-respecting intelligence service. Hence, they can be allies, never friends, and always adversaries.
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