Satisfaction with little is a characteristic of the helpless
When embarking on implementing the plans and engaging in the battle of action to turn desires into tangible field realities and objectives into tangible achievements, sincerity of intentions, high morale, strong determination, and complete dedication are indispensable. Time must be valued for what it is, considering it as the real capital, a gift from the generous Creator. Proper management, skillful harnessing, and adept utilization are crucial, as wasting time is squandering the essence itself and destruction itself.
We have returned to war under generally positive circumstances and with supportive opportunities and motivating winds. However, it is still war, and the enemy has maintained and increased its accumulated capabilities over the first fifteen years of the war. They have added to it with every development in the tools and methods of war during the period between ceasefires and the return to hostilities. We are entangled with the weaknesses generated by the illusory peace treaties and misleading stability.
The return to war allowed us to detail the main fronts, arrange them preferentially, but we did not define the objectives, did not refine the tasks and stages of accomplishment, and did not delve into the methods and requirements. This contributed to a decline in understanding, added to the ambiguity of goals, raised suspicions about directions, confused steps, and clouded evaluations, abandoning established standards.
Each front did not individually face the challenges before it after setting the goals, nor did it enumerate the opportunities helpful in accomplishing its assigned tasks. The main reason is the lack of leadership, ignorance of teamwork, and the absence of competence and primitiveness in institutions.
Everyone knows that a non-regular army needs, after three decades of fake peace, rebuilding, and its ministry is rushing for deep restoration and its integration and training. The activities over the past three years have been characterized by contentment with the minimum due to weak guidance and the absence of leadership. The shortcomings have become routine, and the qualitative operations (KarKarat, Atweizki, Smara, Khobuzat, etc.) have not been organized or executed as part of a comprehensive action but as isolated incidents, alerting the enemy to gaps in its defenses, a flaw in its defense.
In general, the fundamental principle is that every action produces a reaction, and astute leadership not only prepares the force of action but is also ready for the reaction.
The second front, which is the occupied cities, their mobilization, and the instigation of their uprising:
We have settled for a few known activists, who gather in occasional gatherings at homes or in a corner, chanting slogans and sending their images with flags and some descriptions to enemy repression procedures.
We all know that the decisive position, and what the world considers, is the extent of the rejection of the people of the occupied cities for the occupation. This is expressed through confrontation, protests, sit-ins, and measurement by numbers and inclusiveness or contentment with inactivity and reliance on fighters and diplomats, leaving the field with its appearance and essence to the authorities and settlers of the occupation. What has happened is their actions, « municipalities, elections, elders, and sheikhs. » The challenges before the relevant entity are awareness, mobilization, and guidance for two-thirds of the people in the occupied cities in all their categories and locations. Measuring success by the increase in the rates of confrontations, demonstrations, sit-ins, and cases of instability, and the reassurance of the enemy’s tools and the interests of those involved with him.
The existing scene is that we settle for the spoils with safety and secretly. The authorities are there to satisfy tribes or represent tribes. As for the diplomatic front, the biggest and clearest challenge is the international consecration of recognizing the Sahrawi Republic through membership in the United Nations. This requires moving from dubious proposals and distorted solutions and their incomplete recipes to proposals that align with aspirations, gains, and sacrifices.
We have three foreign ministers, but we need a logical division of work among them: Mr. Seidati takes care of bilateral relations, while Mr. Salek handles multilateral relations, partnerships, and recognitions, and the president of SUSKAT Battalion takes care of motivation, guidance, follow-up, and organizing the participation and support of other frameworks in external activities when needed or when they are available.
As for the internal front, especially its political aspect, the biggest challenge is to guide men, both older and younger, and convince them to perform their national duty in all fields. The role of mass organizations and tributaries cannot be compensated because they were created for that purpose.
If we do not rise to the level of the great historical responsibility placed on us, with determination, vision, sincerity, and seriousness, we will lose the trust and fill the grave of the Smara refugee camp before expanding the liberated land or rebuilding it. »
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