The information contained in this report are from public and private sources, and none of information contained herein has been corroborated by third parties.
ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT
March 21, 2014
Executive Summary
Political Trends
· Still unable to stand and struggling to speak clearly, President Bouteflika has formally submitted his candidacy papers for the April 17 presidential election.
· Demonstrations against a fourth term for Bouteflika have mostly been fairly small so far, but show some signs of coalescing with other protest movements over socio-economic issues.
· Several important civil society organisations which backed Bouteflika’s earlier presidential campaigns as a matter of course have proved reluctant to support him this time round, which seems to reflect a lack of full consensus within the power structure itself.
· DRS chief Tewfik appears to have thrown his weight behind the fourth term option, and is likely to have been instrumental in installing former PM Ahmed Ouyahia, who is known to be close to the DRS, as Bouteflika’s chief of staff, in order to counterbalance the overbearing influence of the President’s brother and ‘grand chamberlain’ Saïd.
· Abdelmalek Sellal, who has handed over the premiership to Energy Minister Youcef Yousfi in order to take on the job of Bouteflika’s campaign manager, has further complicated matters by by making disparaging comments about the Berber-speaking Chaoui community of the northeastern Aurès region, home to the core of Algeria’s military elite.
Foreign Relations
· Fighting jihadist groups in northern Mali that are able to move with ease to and from their rear base in southern Libya, France’s military is reorganising its deployment across the Sahel states.
· Coordination between the French military and intelligence services and their US counterparts in the Sahel and the Maghreb appears to be flourishing.
· On the other hand, a degree of mistrust persists between France and Algeria in the Sahara-Sahel region. The situation is not helped by Algerian manoeuvering in northern Mali, partly aimed at countering growing Moroccan influence.
· The French redeployment and the growing US presence across the zone have fuelled alarmist reporting in the Algerian media about supposed plots against Algeria, in which Morocco is depicted as assisting Western powers in their efforts to to destabilise and carve up the country.
· Such reporting seems however to be largely driven by domestic political imperatives, and may quieten down once the presidential election is past.
Security
· Despite unconfirmed reports of a lone terrorist from the south of the country planning attacks against Western embassies in the Algerian capital, Algiers has remained calm.
· There have been several incidents along Algeria’s eastern borders with Tunisia and Libya, including one in which a haul of smuggled MANPADS was reportedly captured.
· The Algerian security forces appear to be getting better at gathering operational intelligence on the Libyan side of the border, enabling them to intercept at least two incursions by armed groups.
Political Trends
On Feb. 22 during a visit to Oran, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal finally broke the suspense and confirmed that President Bouteflika will be standing for re-election on April 17. Two days later, footage of the President receiving an envoy of the Emir of Kuwait was broadcast on state TV, in which he appeared slightly livelier than in his previous, catastrophic TV appearance at the end of last year, but once again without sound; on March 3 the TV news broadcast showed Bouteflika submitting the sponsorship signatures and other paperwork necessary to formalise his candidacy to the Constitutional Council and even included a very short sequence[1] in which he was heard speaking briefly, in a shaky and barely audible voice – the first words ordinary Algerians had heard from the head of state since his Setif speech of May 8, 2012. A fortnight later, Sellal stepped down as Prime Minister in order to take up the job of Bouteflika’s campaign manager (a role he filled in the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections), with Energy Minister Youcef Yousfi taking over from him as Premier. At the same time, former Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia was named Boueflika’s chief of staff (directeur de cabinet) and Abdelaziz Belkhadem returned to his old position as Minister of State and Personal Representative of the President; both are understood to be part of Bouteflika’s campaign team.
No matter how widely expected it had been, Sellal’s confirmation that Bouteflika was standing for re-election was met with dismay in many quarters. Three of the other contenders – former Prime Minister Ahmed Benbitour, retired general Mohand Tahar Yala, and Soufiane Djilali of the Jil Jadid party – instantly cried foul and announced their withdrawal from the presidential contest (although Ali Benflis, arguably the most serious challenger, has opted to remain in the race and has stated his belief that the army “will remain neutral”). A new group calling itself Barakat! (‘Enough!'[2]), which does not seem to have connections to any established political party, has been set up by civil society activists to protest Bouteflika’s bid for a fourth term, and while its repeated attempts to hold demonstrations in Algiers have mostly been quashed unceremoniously by the security forces[3], it has successfully inspired a growing number of (mostly small) protests in other towns and cities. Students at the universities of Tizi Ouzou and Bejaïa have also demonstrated in their hundreds against Bouteflika’s re-election bid, and the same slogans have been taken up by demonstrations of the unemployed in the southern city of Ouargla and by the ongoing movement of disaffected former members of the Garde Communale.
Meanwhile, the “mass organisations” and civil society bodies that rushed to back Bouteflika during his previous presidential campaigns seem by and large far less eager to do so this time round. Although the UGTA (Algeria’s official trade union federation) and the Coordinating Committee of Children of Independence War Martyrs (CNEC) did speak out in favour of a fourth term well before Bouteflika’s candidacy had been publicly confirmed, it is striking that the Organisation Nationale des Moudjahidine (national organisation of independence war veterans – historically the centrepiece of the so-called “revolutionary family”, which has in the past consistently supported the regime’s candidate) initially failed to come out with a clear endorsement of Bouteflika. In a statement issued on March 12, the ONM merely called on the electorate “to fulfil its national duty and choose the person who is best suited to lead the country towards a socio-economic and cultural transition”; commenting on the statement, ONM chairman Saïd Abadou told Arabic-language daily El Khabar that “what matters to us is that this election should be held in the best possible conditions. As for the rest, whoever wins, we will welcome him”. It would seem that the ONM was swiftly called to account, however, since the following day official news agency APS quoted the organisation’s spokesman as explaining that “[our] support for Bouteflika is a question that has been settled” (although even this formulation could be said to be somewhat ambiguous). Similarly, Mahmoud Chaâlal, head of the Union Nationale des Zaouias d’Algérie (one of two national federations of Sufi lodges, which enthusiastically supported Bouteflika in the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections[4]) told reporters on March 7 that “our movement will adopt a position of neutrality and will not support any one candidate” in the presidential election, only to be disavowed, after unspecified “pressure” was reporte
dly brought to bear, by a communiqué issued in the name of the UNZA on March 18 calling on “all f
ollowers of the zaouias and Sufi currents to turn out in force on polling day to elect the servant of the Holy Quran, Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, so as to enable him to complete his political programme”. As for the Fédération des Chefs d’Entreprise, Algeria’s leading employers’ organisation, a general meeting convened on March 13 – after two failed attempts to reach an agreement among members on the matter – finally resolved to throw the organisation’s weight behind Bouteflika, but without the required quorum in attendance for the show-of-hands vote.
Such tergiversations are symptomatic of deep divisions within these organisations as to the wisdom of granting Bouteflika a fourth successive term. A source close to the middle ranks of the DRS and with many years of experience of the modus operandi of the Algerian regime argues that these divisions reflect similar splits within each of the wings of the power structure – the army, the DRS, perhaps even at the Presidency itself. The fourth term option has been steamrollered through in the absence of any consensus among the various clans and interest groups on an alternative candidate, argues the source. The fact that organisations such as the ONM and the UNZA are being whipped into line suggests that the DRS as an institution is backing Bouteflika’s re-election, which would be coherent with earlier reports from well informed sources that DRS commander Lt-Gen. Mohamed ‘Tewfik’ Médiène has lined up behind the fourth term option. The appointment of Ahmed Ouyahia – who is known to be Tewfik’s man – as chief of staff to the President would also seem to be indicative of Tewfik’s active participation, and may be intended to build greater consensus within the power structure by introducing a counterweight to, if not actively sidelining, the President’s widely mistrusted brother Saïd Bouteflika (earlier said by separate source at the Presidency to have taken on the role of grand chamberlain, controlling access to the President and the President’s access to information). There have even been suggestions – which the source close to mid-ranking DRS officers describes as credible – that Ouyahia is being pre-positioned by Tewfik to take on the yet-to-be-created post of Vice President after the election, and thus to succeed Bouteflika when he dies.
But this does not mean that the misgivings of all elements within the DRS and other wings of the power structure have been dispelled, argues the same source, pointing to the case of independent TV channel Atlas TV, effectively forced to close down after a squad of uniformed and plainclothes Gendarmes entered its premises and confiscated cameras and other broadcasting equipment on March 11, apparently in response to its coverage of Barakat! protests and the alleged sympathies of its director of programming Hafnaoui Ghoul[5] for Ali Benflis. Atlas TV, explains the the source, is effectively owned[6] by Maj-Gen. Mhenna Djebbar, the former head of the Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des Armées when it was still part of the DRS who was reportedly pushed into retirement in January, and who is understood to be strongly opposed to a fourth term for Bouteflika.
It is not entirely unclear whether such efforts to contain dissent from within the power structure itself will prove effective. If they are not, dissenters such as Djebbar may continue to exploit and encourage dissent in the population at large, with a heightened risk of things slipping out of control in the month that remains before the presidential election. Decisions by the authorities over the past few days[7] to allow Barakat! to go hold a small protest in Algiers unmolested and to authorise a public meeting by political groups calling for a boycott of the presidential election in the capital on March 21 would seem to denote a degree of confidence on the part of the regime that it has the situation under control. But heightened vigilence would seem to be in order over the coming days and weeks, especially if public protests against Bouteflika’s candidacy begin to snowball and merge with socio-economic protests.
The situation is further complicated by an ugly flare-up in sectarian and regionalist violence. In the town of Ghardaia and outlying areas in the southern Mzab valley, communal tensions between the local Sunni Arab and Berber-speaking Ibadite communities have been running very high since the beginning of the year, and flared again in mid-March into extremely violent rioting in which at least three people were killed and countless shops in central Ghardaia torched. This sparked impromptu demonstrations by Ibadites living in Algiers, calling for the army to be sent in to restore peace. On March 16, interim Prime Minister Youcef Yousfi, Interior Minister Taïeb Belaïz and Gendarmerie commander Maj-Gen. Ahmed Bousteïla flew to Ghardaia in an effort to show that the government was taking the situation seriously – only to find themselves compelled to make a stop-over in the north-eastern city of Batna on the way back to Algiers the following day in response to angry demonstrations and rioting by members of the Berber-speaking Chaoui minority, enraged by unguarded remarks made by Abdelmalek Sellal on national TV in which he appeared to insult their community[8]. Sellal being Bouteflika’s campaign manager, anger at his gaffe has naturally merged into opposition to Bouteflika’s fourth term, provoking the creation of a new grouping calling itself B’zayed (‘Enough’ in the local dialect) in opposition to both. Given the recent tensions within the power structure, the incident is all the more damaging politically in light of the fact that the Chaouis, unlike other Berber speakers in Kabylia and the Mzab, have historically provided a large part of the post-independence military elite.
Foreign Relations
Painfully aware of the trans-national nature of the armed groups it has been pitted against in northern Mali since the beginning of Operation Serval in January 2013, and increasingly concerned about the security vaccuum in southern Libya, the French military quietly embarked on a reorganisation of its forces in northern Africa late last year. Described as a “regionalisation of the Sahel strip”, this move is largely driven by the need to take account of the fact that jihadist groups active in northern Mali have been able to move to and from rear bases in southern Libya via a corridor that passes through the territory of both Niger and Algeria.
Unable to intervene openly in southern Libya itself and with still less possibility of crossing the border into Algeria, the French military is now looking at a single theatre of operations stretching across the three states in the region which are ready to cooperate: Mali, Niger and Chad. French forces will henceforth have four main bases in the zone[9]: N’Djamena (Rafale and Mirage 2000 combat aircraft, supported by tankers and ground forces – plus the general staff controling operations across the Sahel), Niamey (intelligence assets, including two new Reaper drones and Atlantique 2 patrol aircraft, together with combat aircraft), Gao (land forces, plus a large helicopter detachment) and Ouagadougou (the discreet rear base for France’s Sabre special forces). In addition to these four main bases, the French army is establishing forward bases further north, closer to the areas where jihadist groups are likely to be engaged: at Tessalit, in the far north of Mali very close to the Algerian border, at Faya-Largeau in northern Chad, and a third in north-eastern Niger. These forward bases are to serve as dropping-off points to which light combat vehicle and other matériel can be airlifted, as well as centres for the collection of human and/or electronic intelligence. Overall, this deployment in the Sahel will mobilise some 3,000 French troops permanently, supported by around thirty aircraft.
French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian visited Washington in Janua
ry, partly in order to explain this redeployment to the US admin
istration, and it would seem that cooperation between US and French forces in the region is flourishing. A geographical and technical division of labour seems to have emerged, with the US focussing on the northern half of Libya and collection of satellite and other technical intelligence, while the French cover the more southerly regions and provide more human intelligence (informed by local knowledge of their former colonies in the Sahel). A lengthy report in French daily Le Monde (12/03/14), largely based on conversations with French military and intelligence officers, highlighted this cooperation, noting that there are daily consultations between representatives of the CIA, NSA, and France’s DGSE (foreign intelligence) and DRM (military intelligence). Chief of General Staff Admiral Edouard Guillaud is even quoted as saying that “when it comes to confronting Al-Qaeda, we are in almost hourly contact with our American interlocutors at AFRICOM and the Special Operations Command (SOC)”. The US military collaborates with the French in operating drone surveillance missions out of Niamey, and Le Monde suggests that the SOC is working together with French special operations forces based in Ouagadougou.
On the other hand, Le Monde’s article concludes with a note of regret with regard to Algeria’s role:
Paris has not managed to get the European countries involved as much as it would have liked in southern Libya, where military intervention is ruled out. Better to rely on Libya’s neighbours […]. But for regional action to be effective, the major player that is Algeria is still missing. In early 2013, Algeria did close its border with Mali and support Serval in the Adrar des Ifoghas by supplying fuel, signs that Paris felt were very positive. But in the end [even] the In Amenas attack did not change Algeria’s traditional line, which rejects any foreign scrutiny of its handling of terrorism.
Le Monde’s military and intelligence sources seem to stop just short of wondering out loud whether Algiers is part of the solution or part of the problem in the Sahel. Similarly, the usually well informed French blog Secret Défense regrets that “on paper, Algiers and Paris are fighting the same jihadist groups, but realities on the ground and sensitivities on both sides mean that this has not led to close and trusting cooperation. Algeria may therefore remain the blind spot of France’s ‘regionalisation of the Sahel’.”
More specifically, Le Monde quotes a French MoD official as complaining that Algiers has brought Iyad Ag Ghali, head of the Tuareg islamist faction Ansar Dine and until recently an ally of AQMI in northern Mali, “back into the game”, further complicating regional counter-terrorism cooperation. Before embarking on his short-lived alliance with AQMI in 2012, Ag Ghali had a long history of contacts with Algeria’s DRS. Since the fall of the jihadi statelet in northern Mali under the hammer blows of Operation Serval, he appears to have resumed contacts with Algiers, and has reportedly relocated with his family to the village of Tinzaouten, on the Algerian side of the border, with the blessing of the DRS. Algiers’ efforts to re-establish its influence in the complex situation in northern Mali, and to counter growing Moroccan involvement in its “back yard”, have also led it to back the creation of a new breakaway group by Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh, formerly a leading member of the Tuareg separatist MNLA. The new group, calling itself Conseil du Peuple pour l’Azawad, was formally established at Hassi Labyad in the desert of northern Mali on March 18 at a ceremony attended by some 700 people, including members of other ethnic groups according to Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh. The new movement’s leader has explicitly stated MNLA leader Bilal Ag Acherif’s rapprochement with Morocco as one of the main reasons for the split, telling Paris-based newsmagazine Jeune Afrique that he opposed Bilal Ag Acherif:
Trying to put the legitimate struggle of the people of Azawad at the service of other ends, notably those of certain states, which do not correspond with ours. […] I am speaking in particular of the conflict between Rabat and Algiers, in which we should not get involved […]. It is not so much that he is too close to Rabat. We share a border with Algeria. If it wasn’t for French colonisation, there wouldn’t even be a border between Azawad and Algeria. Our people is present on either side of this line. But we don’t exist at all in Morocco. […] He asked the King of Morocco to mediate. Instead of solliciting this new mediation […] we should be accepting Algeria’s.
Moroccan involvement in the Sahara-Sahel zone – real or imagined – has been linked to a supposed Western plot against Algeria in a slew of articles in the Algerian press[10]. French language daily L’Expression has been particularly virulent on this subject, running no fewer than three highly alarmist articles – under the headlines ‘L’Algérie est-elle réellement en danger?’, ‘Moscou alerte Alger’ and ‘Les dessous d’un plan de déstabilisation de l’Algérie’ – in the space of less than a fortnight. The overall tone is distinctly paranoiac:
France is going to establish a military base in northern Mali, near the Algerian border. It is already present in force in Mauritania.
The US Marines have chosen southern Tunisia, Italy and Spain to establish their bases in order to intervene in North Africa in case of force majeure. And there is such a good excuse! The fight against terrorism […] is a cover for the West’s true objective: to besiege Algeria, a major producer of oil and natural gas. It would be naive not to believe in a strategic and geopolitical conspiracy against the only state that has not been subject to the vagaries of the Arab Spring.
[…]
The contours of a Machiavellian plot against Algeria are becoming clearer. Moscow, in the person its Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, has taken the trouble of alerting the Algerian authorities.
[ … ]
During a brief visit to Tunisia a few days ago, the Russian Foreign Minister argued that “foreign parties” are marketing an “Algerian spring” with the real aim of laying waste to Algeria. Without naming them, the Russian diplomat added that these same parties “have opened several fronts near the Algerian borders, in Libya, Tunisia and Mali.” [ … ]
The Russian Foreign Minister directly incriminated those who lay behind the upheavals that were deliberately stirred up in Tunisia, Libya and Mali, whence comes the biggest threat against Algeria. He believes that the conspirators of the new world order draw up their their plans based on a policy of influence, focusing on minority groups and terrorist networks[11].
[ … ]
Even Morocco is a party. Does not [King Mohamed VI’s] recent trip to Mali point to a predetermined agenda? The hand of the Makhzen is no stranger to what is going on in Ghardaia, where revolts among local people have broken out again. Drug barons and members of MUJAO are behind this, according to very well informed sources. The goal, obviously, being to create an unsettled environment in order to destabilise the country.
[…]
To achieve his objectives, Uncle Sam first praises Algeria, portraying it as a pivotal country in the fight against terrorism in North Africa, a leader. While flattering Algeria’s skills and military power, [Washington] is in the process of gathering together all the necessary ingredients.
[…] Even if the US puts forward coordinating the fight against terrorism as a pretext for its mobilization in Africa, it is hard to believe that the US has no interest in an area of Algeria that is rich in shale gas, conventional gas and other minerals such as uranium. Complicit local clans are already on the ground, ready to fire up the engine of destabilisation.
On the surface of things, such analyses – which pass without comment in a mainstr
eam Algerian daily newspaper – do not bode at all well for the future of Algerian secu
rity cooperation with France and the United States. However, while L’Expression’s articles might be said to express a siege mentality that does seem to exist within sections of Algeria’s power structure, it is worth noting that the particularly overblown rhetoric appears to be generated at least as much by the present domestic political situation as by developments beyond Algeria’s borders. Dark references to “complicit clans” acting in cahoots with Algeria’s enemies speaks to the lingering rivalry between antagonistic factions within and around the power structure, while the scarecrows of destabilisation and “foreign plots” (which of course had pride of place in the speech read on behalf of Bouteflika by Veterans’ Affairs Minister Mohamed Cherif Abbas on Feb. 18, warning against criticism of the DRS) have become central to the regime’s arguments against those who dare to protest against the fourth term option. Viewed in this context, it would therefore seem likely – if the regime manages successfully to weather the next few, crucial weeks without any serious outbreak of unrest – that such rhetoric will fade once the presidential election is past.
Security
Levels of violence in February were broadly on a par with previous months, with 11 security-related incidents overall including five jihadist operations. Levels of activity rose sharply in the last week of February, however, and have remained high so far in March, with 17 security related incidents, including four jihadist operations, up until March 19.
ALGIERS and surrounding areas were quiet, although there were claims in the Tunisian media on March 11 that the Algerian security forces were hunting for a “terrorist”, apparently from the southern town of Djelfa, who was said to be planning an attack against the US or Canadian embassies in Algiers. Although this report was not corroborated by any other sources, it does call to mind the document, attributed to AQMI’s leader in the Sahara Djamel Okacha (a.k.a. Abou Yahia El Hamam), that has been circulating in jihadist internet forums since the beginning of the year, promising terror attacks against Western interests, including embassies, in Algeria, Tunisia and other countries of the region.
Immediately to the east of the capital, Kabylia has seen heavy activity these past few weeks, mostly army operations. The security forces led two major search and destroy missions, one in the Sidi Ali Bounab area between the wilayas of Boumerdès and Tizi Ouzou in late February-early March, and the other in the area of Azeffoun-Iflissen-Aghribs in the north of the wilaya of Tizi Ouzou starting from March 11 and still ongoing. Each resulted in a number of clashes with jihadists leaving 14 of them dead.
There have been several incidents along both the northern and southern stretches of Algeria’s EASTERN BORDERS:
– A total of 40 missiles were seized by the Algerian army near the border with Libya, a security source told Chinese news agency Xinhua on February 26. The weapons were reportedly being transported by “members of Aqmi” heading to northern Mali, who were intercepted by Algerian army in the locality of Djanet in the province of Illizi. Some 40 Katyusha missiles and a number of SA-7 surface-to-air missiles[12] were seized, according to Xinhua’s source. During this operation, the army forces managed to arrest two of the members of the group, one of whom was seriously injured, while an undetermined number fled to neighbouring Libya. Although Xinhua did not say exactly when the operation took place, Algerian Arabic-language daily Echorouk said it was around February 24, and claimed that the smugglers were “probably” members Abdessalam Tarmoune’s Sons of the South for Islamic Justice movement. Algerian Arabic-language daily El-Khabar reported that the vehicles had been detected before crossing the border, while in the vicinity of the Libyan town of Ghat.
– El-Khabar said on March 12 that security forces in the first week of March dismantled a terrorist cell in the area of Tarat, wilaya of Illizi, on the border with Libya. The group of four to six men was led by a certain Abou Tareq Mehdi, half-brother of Ahmad Tlemci, “leader of Mujao”, who was working to create a jihadist-smuggling outfit of local Tuareg to oversee the smuggling routes between Libya and Niger “in partnership with militias in Libya”.
– The Algerian army on March 18 reportedly intercepted and killed “five Libyan militiamen” south of Deb Deb, wilaya of Illizi, on the border with Libya. Four kalashnikovs and one heavy machine gun were recovered in the operation. As with the interception of the missile shipment near Djanet, press reports suggested that the group had been detected by an Algerian surveillance aircraft before crossing into Algeria from Ghadames, Libya.
– Further to the north, on the border with Tunisia, security forces on March 13 foiled an attempt by a jihadist group to set up a fake check point on the RN-10 road in the wilaya of Tébessa, near the Bouchebka border post. Soldiers spotted the jihadist group and moved in their direction, prompting them to flee, leaving behind two cars. The army launched a search and destroy mission in the area.
– The next day, March 14, the army is reported to have intercepted and killed seven jihadists in the same area around Bouchebka, wilaya of Tébessa. Some press reports said two other jihadists were arrested and two soldiers were wounded in the operation. The group had reportedly crossed into Algeria from Tunisia. Three days later, Tunisian police shot and killed three suspected jihadists near Jendbouba, on the other side of the border; it is not clear whether there is a direct link between the two incidents.
One incident was reported on the SOUTHERN BORDERS, in which the security forces ambushed and detained a “dangerous jihadist” in the town of Timiaouine, wilaya of Adrar, near the border with Mali on March 12.
Elsewhere in the SOUTH of the country:
– On February 25, according to El-Khabar, the Algerian army discovered an explosives cache in the desert near Reggane wilaya of Adrar, containing “1,420 explosive canisters ready for use.” Three men were arrested “after a long chase”.
– Algerian military aviation on March 8 bombarded a jihadist group in the area between the wilayas of Ouargla and Illizi, destroying an offroader and killing three people on board.
END
Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel, Ret.
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[1] French TV channel Canal +, which had caused a stir in December of last year when it analysed Algerian state TV footage of Bouteflika’s meeting with French Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault and demonstrated that it had been doctored to make the President appear far more lively than he actually was, again picked apart the footage of Bouteflika’s appearance at the Constitutional Council, arguing that two takes seemed to have been necessary simply to splice together 15 seconds of the President’s voice.
[2] To the outside observer at least, the name is reminiscent of Egypt’s Kefaya (‘Enough’) movement, which campaigned against Hosni Mubarak’s presidency in the years preceding the 2011 uprising. But in the Algerian context it is a more direct reference to the slogan (sbaâ snin barakat! – ‘seven years [of war] are enough!’) of the spontaneous movement in Algeria’s cities against the internecine fighting that broke out immediately after independence in 1962 between the civilian leadership of the FLN
(backed by part of the revolutionary army of the interior) and the Morocco-based Armée des Frontières headed by Houari Boumedienne – and from which the
original “Oujda clan” emerged victorious.
[3] Demonstrations have been banned in the capital since the massive march on Algiers organised by the aârouch (traditional tribal councils) of Kabylia in June 2001.
[4] Just two years ago, Mahmoud Chaâlal was still boasting that “in the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections, Abdelaziz Bouteflika was returned thanks to us. Which we are delighted about. What is more, the President is a sufi.”
[5] Journalist and activist Hafnaoui Ghoul is a long-standing member of the Ligue Algérienne de Défense des Droits de l’Homme and formerly of the Mouvement des Enfants du Sud pour la Justice.
[6] Technically, the company is understood to be in the name of Djebbar’s son-in-law.
[7] Apparently in response to the French government’s public call for the right to peaceful protest to be respected
[8] “You know what we say in Constantine? The Chaoui, hasha rizk rabbi” – a virtually untranslatable colloquialism that expresses regret for having mentioned something obscene. Sellal’s subsequent insistence that he was only joking and that some of his best friends are Chaouis has, predictably enough, done little to calm things.
[9] Supported by three larger rear bases in West Africa: Dakar (Senegal), Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) and Libreville (Gabon).
[10] Referencing a number of far more serious articles that have appeared recently in the American mainstream and specialist press, notably: ‘US Military Presence in Africa Growing in Small Ways’, Los Angeles Times 07/03/14; ‘U.S. Takes Training Role in Africa as Threats Grow and Budgets Shrink’, New York Times, 05/03/14; and ‘ The In Amenas Attack in the Context of Southern Algeria’s Growing Social Unrest’, CTC Sentinel (Combatting Terrorism Center, West Point), February 2014.
[11] No trace of the remarks attributed to Lavrov while in Tunisia is to be found elsewhere than in the Algerian media.
[12] A report by a UN panel of experts on arms transfers concerning Libya dated February 19 states that it has documented the presence of “Libyan SA-7b” manpads in “Chad, Mali, Tunisia, Lebanon and potentially in the Central African Republic”. Algeria did not feature on the list – perhaps because Algiers would not allow the panel of experts to inspect seized weapons reportedly smuggled from Libya. According to the same report: “Several media articles in 2013 and 2014 reported seizures by Algeria of materiel originating from Libya. Security sources in Libya, Tunisia and the Niger have indicated that transfers are still occurring from Libya to Algeria, sometimes through Tunisia, to groups based in Algeria and Mali. […] The Panel sent several letters to Algeria following its mission to Algiers in 2012. It also met with the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations in New York in May 2013 to request a visit and to gain access to the seized materiel. The Committee [overseeing the panel of experts] wrote to Algeria in September 2013 in that regard, and again in January 2014, when it suggested the week of 4 March 2014 for the visit. No response has been conveyed to the Committee or the Panel.”
