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ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT
June 27, 2014
Executive Summary
Political Trends
· A conference in Algiers on June 10 brought together the broadest ever range of opposition parties and personalities behind the demand for a “peaceful democratic transition”. The opposition parties still have no joint platform, however, and no strategy for convincing the power structure of the need to accept change, making it easy for the PM to brush them off as irrelevant.
· The Presidency is forging ahead with consultations around its draft constitutional amendment package, while the government has met under President Bouteflika’s chairmanship to adopt the “presidential programme of action” for the next five years.
· There have been some indications that tensions persist to some degree within the establishment, despite the successful re-election of Bouteflika. Against this background, moves by CoS Gaïd Saleh to push over 70 army and DRS officers into retirement have been interpreted as a purge of those who might have thrown in their lot with efforts to block Bouteflika’s fourth term of office by having him impeached on grounds of ill health.
· Whether or not the proposed retirements are politically motivated, there are signs that they are meeting some resistance within the military, at a time when the army and the DRS face unprecedented challenges on the country’s borders.
Foreign Relations
· Following on from the French Defence Minister’s visit in mid-May, the French Gendarmerie commander and Foreign Minister have also held talks in Algiers, with potential cooperation in “pacifying” northern Mali and southern Libya high on the agenda in all cases.
· Algiers appears keen to capitalise on its continuing rapprochement with Paris by urging the French to “help” Morocco reach agreement with Polisario.
· There has been a rash of press reports of operations by the Algerian army and DRS in Libya, in contradiction with the established doctrine of not intervening militarily in other countries.
· While these reports have met with strenuous official denials, private sources confirm that Algerian forces have indeed been conducting counter-terrorism operations on Libyan territory and have established control over a buffer strip on the Libyan side of the border.
· Military intervention in foreign countries and collaboration with “imperialist” nations remain highly controversial, but with no end in sight to the operations in Libya now that they have begun, there is likely to be increasing pressure to address these issues more openly.
Security
· After relatively high levels of political violence in May, including several clashes between the security forces and arms smugglers and/or jihadists along the border with Libya, reporting has all but dried up in June, suggesting that a news blackout may have been enforced in connection with the Algerian army’s controversial intervention in Libya.
· The capital has remained quiet, but a network set up to send would-be fighters to Syria has been discovered in the adjacent wilaya of Blida, suggesting that AQMI still faces competition for recruits from the more ‘fashionable’ jihadist groups in Syria.
· As the situation in Libya deteriorates, the Presidency and the General Staff are reported to have issued orders for a new operation to secure the eastern border and oil and gas production sites, which involves exclusion zones on the Algerian side of the border and intensive patrolling of the border by army helicopters.
Political Trends
On June 10, the long-awaited conference organised by the National Coordinating Committee for Freedoms and Democratic Transition (CNLTD) in response to the re-election of Bouteflika convened in Algiers, bringing together what was undoubtedly the broadest range of opposition parties and personalities Algeria has ever seen: in addition to the members of the CNLTD itself[1], the conference saw participation from the mainly Kabyle, social-democratic FFS, the moderate islamist El Islah, Bouteflika’s main challenger in the April election Ali Benflis, veteran human rights campaigner Ali Yahia Abdenour, and former Prime Ministers Mouloud Hamrouche, Sid Ahmed Ghozali and Mokdad Sifi. However much of an achievement it was to bring together such a broad panel, in the final analysis the mountain laboured and brought forth a mouse: after a day of speeches, the conference handed the task of penning a new “platform for freedoms and democratic transition” over to a committee that has yet to be established and which seems to have no deadline for completing the job. The main slogan that emerged from the conference, around which the future platform ought theoretically to be built, was for a peaceful, negotiated transition to a more authentically democratic system. But the question of how the power structure might be induced to negotiate anything at all with the opposition does not seem to have been addressed – an omission that speaks volumes as to the opposition parties’ lack of confidence in their own capacity for mass mobilisation, and their failure to connect with existing grassroots protest campaigns (such as the well organised movement of unemployed youth in the south of the country, the movement against fracking that is now also emerging in the south, the long suffering families of the ‘disappeared’ who appealed – apparently in vain – to the conference for help, etc.).
It is perhaps no great surprise therefore that the power structure itself has remained largely impervious to this “historic” event. Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal did allude to the opposition’s initiative in a speech to parliament on June 5, but only to brush aside the very idea of a “democratic transition” as irrelevant, since “we are a democratic country [and] people have to realise that the transition is behind us”. The Presidency is pressing on regardless with the consultations around its own, very limited, constitutional reform package; some of the participants in the June 10 conference, such as the FFS, have consented to take part in the consultations while others are boycotting the whole process, which is in itself indicative of the very flimsy nature of the opposition alliance. Meanwhile, the Council of Ministers met twice in May, under the chairmanship of President Bouteflika[2], adopting the draft “Government Action Plan for the implementation of the presidential programme”.
Behind the appearance of business as usual, however, there are some indications that tensions within the power structure may not have been laid to rest by the successful re-election of Bouteflika. AlgériePatriotique.com – an online newspaper that is understood to be co-owned by the sons of DRS chief Lt-Gen. Mohamed ‘Tewfik’ Médiène and former Defence Minister and CoS Gen. Khaled Nezzar – has for example reported that Gen. Nezzar has declined an invitation to take part in the consultations on constitutional reform. Nezzar, once the leading light of the so-called “eradicator” faction of the army and never a fan of Bouteflika’s, is said to be disgruntled that suggestions he made during the round of consultations on the constitution held in 2011 were essentially ignored and, beyond this, to be fuming about Bouteflika’s stage-managed re-election this year and, in particular, “the army’s role in this event”. AlgériePatriotique.com has also reported that Col. Fawzi, the former head of the Centre de Communication et de Diffusion (the DRS’s former media management branch), who was among the prominent DRS officers dismissed last year, has been forbidden to leave the country[3] pending prosecution – for unspecified offences – before a “specialised court”. For his part, the present CoS and Deputy Defence Minister, Lt-Gen. Ahmed Gaïd Sa
leh, is reported to have convened the Haut Conseil de la Fonction Militaire[4] in the days following Bouteflika’s investiture in order to have it approve a list of 74 DRS and army officers to be put out to grass in the upcoming annual round of retirements and promotions on July 5. This list – which is said to await President Bouteflika’s signature – seems to be a modified version of the list of 80 or more names Gaïd Saleh is reported to have proposed in mid-January[5].
A source close to the middle ranks of the DRS suggests that the mooted retirements are in fact a barely disguised purge, casting them as a prolongation of the wave of changes that began last summer with the removal of Col. Fawzi and continued in the following months with the removal of Gen. M’henna Djebbar, Maj-Gen. Bachir Tartag et al. The source claims that these and other senior DRS officers are accused of having attempted to orchestrate a “coup d’Etat blanc” after Bouteflika’s stroke in April of last year, by exploiting their influence over Algeria’s media and political parties to force through the application of article 88 of the constitution (which provides for the impeachment of the President on grounds of lasting incapacitation). With his new list of 70-plus names for retirement, Gaïd Saleh is now going after their various sympathisers in the DRS and the army, the source suggests. Tewfik, it would seem, is not seen as having been in cahoots with the alleged plotters. The source adds that there have been lengthy internal discussions about who should be left on or taken off the list, since many of the officers in question have not yet reached retirement age and there is resistance within the army to dispensing with their skills when the country is virtually on a war footing because of the deteriorating situation in Libya and the Sahel.
This account, which casts the changes in the army and the intelligence service in a new light, has not as yet been either confirmed to us or denied by other sources close to the military and security establishment, although a source close to Bouteflika told us, albeit over the ‘phone, “the President has neutered ‘them’ (sic), and as long as he remains alive, none of ‘them’ will dare raise his head again.” In this connection it may be worth quoting at some length from El Watan’s article on the retirements Lt-Gen. Gaïd Saleh is said to be preparing for July 5:
Informed sources say that […] “these retirements are being imposed by leaders who themselves well past retirement age. The majority of heads of military regions and services should have retired long ago. Why have they not been concerned by the application of Article 20[6]? Is it normal for officers as young as 50 years to be retiring?” The answer, say our interlocutors, is known to all. “We are in the same situation as in 2004, when part of the army, represented by Chief of Staff Lt-Gen. Mohamed Lamari had refused to endorse Bouteflika’s second term, seconded by Gen. Toufik. But the late Smail Lamari and Larbi Belkheir were strong supporters of Bouteflika and eventually won over Gen. Toufik, who then sacrificed the Chief of Staff and a list of senior officers, officers and non-commissioned officers, who all retired in 2006 with another wave in 2008, under very suspicious circumstances. No one had so much as imagined Gaïd Salah could ever become Chief of Staff when he was already thought to be close to retirement in 2004. The relationship between him and the President has grown quite strong and […] he is only accountable to the President, or perhaps rather the brother of the President. He is […] organising a witch-hunt for troublesome officers just when the military needs them the most because of the situation on our borders,” explain our interlocutors. They call these measures “score-settling that might make the sense of frustration in the ranks even worse and lead to demoralisation, and that is something the military could really do without, especially in these times of crisis … .”
The article, it should be noted, appeared under the by-line of Salima Tlemçani, a veteran journalist with an established record of being used as a conduit by certain elements within the military and the security services.
Foreign Relations
On May 27, less than a week after French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian’s visit to Algiers, Gen. Denis Favier, the head of France’s Gendarmerie (which answers to the Ministry of the Interior) arrived in the Algerian capital at the head of a sizeable delegation for two days of discussions with Algerian Gendarmerie commander Maj-Gen. Ahmed Boustila and his team. On June 8, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius flew in for a two-day visit, during which he was received by President Bouteflika and held talks with his opposite number Ramtane Lamamra, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal and Industry Minister Abdesselam Bouchouareb. Questions of regional security, and in particular the situations in Mali and southern Libya, were central to all of these visits, which Algerian French-language daily Liberté was quick to portray as part of a broader campaign of “strong [international] pressure on Algeria to get involved militarily in the Sahel”, pointing to what it suggested were the first signs of operational collaboration in the field between Algerian and French forces[7]. At a joint press conference with his Algerian counterpart, Foreign Minister Fabius saluted Algeria’s “pacifying role” in Mali[8] and proclaimed that France and Algeria “stand side by side in the fight against terrorism”. At the same time however, he dismissed any suggestions that the two countries’ armed forces might be involved in joint military operations in Libya as “allegations with no basis in reality”.
The French Foreign Minister was referring to a series of press reports, beginning with an article in London Times on May 30[9], claiming that the Algerian military had begun conducting anti-terrorist operations on Libyan soil – a breach of Algeria’s official doctrine, which eschews military operations beyond the country’s own borders. While the Times article limited itself to asserting that “French, American and Algerian special forces have been sent to the south of Libya to attack terrorist networks” and did not elaborate further with regard to the alleged Algerian involvement, Algerian daily El Watan soon picked up the story, adding a wealth of detail. In its June 6 edition, noting that “no official would talk about it,” El Watan reported that “Algerian forces have been on the offensive in Libya since May 29”. Some “3,500 Algerian paratroopers plus a 1,500-strong logistical support unit are currently deployed on the other side of the [Algeria-Libya] border,” claimed the daily, adding that “another source, a diplomat, talked of 5,000 troops on the ground and a major aerial operation”. The military’s plan stresses mobility, so the troops “move aboard lightly armed off-roaders with machine guns, supported by artillery.” The real heavy firepower “comes from the Algerian military’s attack helicopters”. El Watan adds that “other players joined the American-French-Algerian effort: forces from Chad and forces loyal to Libya’s Gen. Haftar”. El Watan revisited the story on June 13, reporting that the operation was “still under way, now in its second week”, covering a strip of territory about 100 km deep on the Libyan side of the border:
Surveillance aircraft detect targets which are then “handled” by ground troops or attack helicopters. It should also be noted that there are constant contacts with Libyan tribes to reassure and support them. The idea is to stabilise the west of Libya so as to make sure that isolated and vulnerable tribes do not throw in their lot with the jihadists. Another objective is to destroy the military and logistics capacity of jihadist groups and occupy space so as to prevent them from leaving Libya. The thick of the action is happening in Benghazi, where the
forces of Gen. Haftar are facing stiff resistance from Islamist militias. Egyptian forces are also taking part in operations the east of Libya, whereas France, which is deploying modest forces but working with the Chadians, is taking care of Libya’s south. The US deployed its helicopter carrier USS Bataan with 2,000 troops on board carrying out targeted attacks.
On June 16, France’s Nouvel Observateur reiterated the news: commandos from Algeria’s 4th parachute regiment, combat helicopters and men from the DRS’s Special Intervention Group were said to be operating in Libya alongside America’s 317th Special Forces Squadron (sic). “They are there,” Le Nouvel Observateur claimed, “to help Gen Haftar take power”[10]. According to the French news magazine, which says its information “was not denied by Algerian security sources,” some 25,000 Algerian troops are deployed along the border with Libya. Le Nouvel Observateur did not, on the other hand, mention any French presence.
Algerian officials have repeatedly denied such reports. Even before the Times broke the story, Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra was assuring reporters on the sidelines of a ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers on May 26 that “Algeria is not ready to coordinate with” Gen. Khalifa Haftar and “will not change its policy of non-interference in the affairs of brotherly and friendly countries”[11]. After the first El Watan article, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal assured parliament that “the Algerian military will not intervene in any foreign country as long as Bouteflika is head of state”, while other dailies such as Echourouk and L’Expression ran articles quoting unnamed security sources as denying categorically that there had been or could ever be any breach of Algeria’s “sacrosanct principle” of non-intervention in conflicts beyond its borders. On June 17, Algerian Defence Ministry sources were again quoted as denying the reports, especially Le Nouvel Observateur’s version which was described as “a deliberate disinformation effort”.
And yet, however strenuous the denials, it would seem that there is no smoke without fire. Concordant sources have assured us that the Algerian military is indeed involved in cross-border operations to the east. A member of the staff of Sonatrach’s legal department told us in mid-June:
As of May 22, elite units of the Algerian armed forces entered Libyan territory, in particular going into the area around Ghadames in order to secure the assets of Sipex, Sonatrach’s subsidiary in Libya. Once the assets – drilling sites in blocks 65, 95 and 96 – had been secured, Sipex repatriated all its personnel, at the same time as the Algerian staff of other companies and Algerian diplomats who had been posted to Libya[12]. On the ground, the Algerian army controls a strip several kilometres deep on the Libyan side of the border.
Speaking to us a week earlier, a source close to a number of middle-ranking DRS officers was even more explicit:
Elements from the 4th Parachute Regiment, which is based in Ouargla, are operating over 200 km deep within Libyan territory. And they are not alone. Snipers from the DRS’s Special Intervention Group have also conducted several missions in Libya. One of them resulted in the elimination of 13 influential members of terrorist groups that were planning to attack Algeria’s vital oil installations at Hassi Messaoud, and another culminated in the elimination of the head of an islamist militia from Misrata. All these operations have been organised with the assistance of militiamen from the Zintan brigades[13] and members of the Warfalla tribe.
Neither source, however, mentioned any collaboration with Gen. Haftar’s campaign against islamist militias in the north of the country. It is also striking that they both remained silent on the matter of cooperation with US or French forces. While it seems likely that there would be at least some information sharing with the French and the Americans[14], the idea of active collaboration with “imperialist” powers is at least as much of a taboo in Algeria as the idea of intervening militarily in other countries in the first place, if not more so. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that nobody is shouting it from the rooftops. But having crossed the Rubicon by sending troops into Libya, Algiers finds itself involved in cross-border operations with no clear end date; as they drag on, some form of coordination with US, French and possibly other forces is likely to become increasingly unavoidable, and pressure to address these controversial issues publicly will grow correspondingly.
In the meantime, the rapprochement with France continues, with Speaker of the APN (lower house of parliament) Mohamed Larbi Ould Khalifa visiting Paris on June 18 for a follow-up visit with Laurent Fabius, during which “stability in the North Africa-Sahel region” was once again the central theme. In a statement issued after their talks, Fabius again lauded Algeria as “a key country in a troubled region” that “plays a strategic role in the consecration of security and stability”. Algeria, the French Foreign Minister added approvingly, “protects the entire region from the impact of crises in certain countries with which it shares extensive borders” For his part, Ould Khalifa called for coordination between Algeria and France in the fight against terrorism, stressing the importance of “preserving the stability of the region of North Africa and the Sahel” and highlighting the role and contribution of Algeria “in the settlement of internal crises in certain countries”. Neither did the Algerian parliamentary Speaker miss the occasion to slip in a reference to the Western Sahara conflict, emphasising the need to “help” the Polisario Front and Morocco “implement international resolutions on the right to self-determination”.
Security
Levels of violence in May were relatively high, with some 21 security incidents (of which eight were initiated by the jihadists themselves) making it the busiest month since August 2013. However, these levels of activity do not appear to have carried on into June, which has so far been unusually quiet, with only two operations reported by June 18 – although it is possible that this is the consequence of a media blackout that may have been imposed in connection with the Algerian army’s incursions into Libya (see above) and extended to cover the whole the country. Strikingly, there has been not a single incident reported along the southern border with Mali since mid-May – which, if our assumption that a media blackout is in place, may be a measure of the political sensitivity of the question of military and intelligence cooperation with French forces operating just across the border.
ALGIERS and its suburbs were generally quiet, although the press reported that security forces in the wilaya of Blida, adjacent to Algiers, “dismantled a network that had been recruiting fighters for Syria” around June 4, arresting eight people. This is however unlikely to have had any direct connection to AQMI, which has been competing for recruits with the tug of Syria, releasing a statement in March 2013 in which it implored “the Muslim youth in the Maghreb and especially Tunisia[15]” not to leave to take part in jihad in other countries unless “the leaders of jihad in your area, judging the move to be in the interest of Islam, authorise you to go”.
KABYLIA was unusually quiet this past month, with only two operations reported (a roadside bomb in Tizi Ouzou on May 28 and an ambush of a security forces patrol near Kadiria, Bouira, on June 4).
There were a handful of incidents in the WEST of the country, including a roadside bomb on May 28 that killed one soldier and wounded a number of others aboard a supply truck on their way to a border post with Morocco, near Beni Snous in the wilaya of Tlemcen. Also of note was an incid
ent on June 16 in which the shrine of Sidi Cheikh, in the town of the same name in the wilaya of El-Bayadh, was burnt down by persons unknown – the second attack against a Sufi shrine within a month, following the attack on the shrine in Merine, wilaya of Sidi Bel Abbès on May 13 (see previous report).
Several incidents were reported in the SOUTH EAST of the country:
– Security forces on May 19 arrested five people in In Amenas suspected of running an arms smuggling ring between Mali, Chad and Libya.
– Also on May 19, the Algerian army killed eight Libyan militiamen near the border with Libya. The armed group was reportedly preparing to set up an ambush for Algerian border patrols. Al-Khabar, which reported the story, gave no details on the location of the incident, except for saying that the bodies of the dead fighters were taken to Bordj Omar Driss, in the northwest of the wilaya of Illizi, which suggests the incident took place in the northern sector of the border strip between Algeria and Libya.
– The security forces on May 20 raided an arms cache near the town of El-Oued, near the border with Tunisia, and recovered at least 11 machine guns and “eight missiles” believed to have been smuggled in from Libya.
– Al-Khabar, May 22, quoted “informed sources” as saying that “the highest security authorities” had dispatched “117 special operations troops” to Djanet, wilaya of Illizi, to plan operations against the forces of one Zain bin Qada, a Libyan militia leader who used to serve in Qadhafi’s forces and had established a base in the Libyan town of Dirj[16]. A week later, the same newspaper reported that the Algerian General Staff had decided to send 5,000 additional troops to the border with Libya.
– Al-Khabar on May 25 said the Algerian army had “in the past two days” foiled an attempt by a group of seven armed Libyan militiamen to cross into Algeria “in the Djili area of the wilaya of Illizi”. Two of the armed men were killed and five arrested. Seven machine guns, one heavy machine gun and three RPG shells were seized.
END
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[1] Three moderate islamist parties, the MSP, the FJD and Ennahda, the mainly Kabyle secularist RCD, the smaller and more recently formed Jil Jadid, plus former Prime Minister Ahmed Benbitour.
[2] In addition to chairing the two Council of Ministers meetings on May 7 and 21, President Bouteflika has begun receiving foreign visitors far more regularly than was the case prior to the presidential election – every few days since the beginning of May, and on some occasions more than one per day – suggesting that his stamina is improving. After being received by Bouteflika on June 9, visiting French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius told France Info radio station that the President had showed “great mental alacrity, but he has a problem with elocution. He speaks very softly, so he has a little microphone to talk through.”
[3] Similarly, there were reports in the Algerian media at the beginning of April of Gen. M’henna Djebbar, the former head of the Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des Armées, being informed, as he was about to board a flight at Algiers Houari Boumedienne International Airport, that he was barred from leaving the country.
[4] The HCFM, established by presidential order in February 2006, is supposed to be chaired by the Defence Minister (i.e. Bouteflika) but it would seem that this responsibility has been delegated to Gaïd Saleh in his capacity as Deputy Defence Minister. The Haut Conseil is “the institutional framework in which are discussed general issues relating to the condition and status of military personnel” and includes: the Permanent Undersecretary of the Ministry of Defence; the commanders of the army, navy, air force, air defence, gendarmerie and the Republican Guard; the commanders of the military regions; and the head of the DRS.
[5] In its June 8 issue, Algerian daily El Watan referred to a meeting of the HCFM on January 14, noting that it was at this meeting that several high-ranking DRS officers (Col. Fawzi; ex-DCSA chief Maj-Gen. Mhenna Djebbar; former special intervention force commander Gen. Abdelkader Ait Ourabi, or Ouarab, a.k.a. Hassan; and Gen. Chafik, former head of the SCPJ, the investigative police branch of the DRS that was abolished last autumn) were put into retirement. At the time, however, news portal Tout Sur l’Algérie and two private sources suggested that the retirements had been discussed at a meeting on January 13 of a newly established ‘Special Security Commission’ rather than the HCFM.
[6] Of the regulations governing the status of military personnel, which sets maximum age limits for various ranks of officer.
[7] “Leaks in France have suggested that the recent neutralisation of ten AQMI terrorists by the Algerian army on the border with Mali was the result of intelligence supplied by France and after an operation in the Adrar des Ifoghas region of northern Mali by French special forces involved in Operation Serval.”
[8] On June 9, after months of cajoling by Algerian diplomats, six northern Malian movements – the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA), Coordination of the People of Azawad (CPA), Coordination of Movements of Patriotic Resistance Fronts (CM-FPR), the Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA), the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) and the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) – came together in Algiers to sign two documents committing themselves to a peace process based on inclusive dialogue and respect for the territorial integrity of Mali.
[9] ‘US special forces arrive to tackle Libya Islamists’. Deborah Haynes, Michael Evans and Hassan Morajea. The Times, May 30 2014.
[10] Khalifa Haftar, a retired military officer who heads the self-styled “Libyan National Army”, launched a large scale air and ground offensive against powerful islamist militias in the Benghazi area on May 16 that he described as a « correction to the path of the revolution », dubbing it Operation Dignity. Haftar’s offensive did not have the approval of the central Libyan government, and on May 18 was extended into Tripoli, with the storming of the Libyan General National Congress building by militiamen from the western town of Zintan. Haftar’s offensive against the islamist militias, which is still ongoing, enjoys a good measure of popular support, but has been cast as a thinly disguised coup attempt
[11] Lamamra was reacting to rumours of Algerian support for Khalifa Haftar’s “Operation Dignity”, which have been encouraged by Haftar’s own public statements. In an interview with Egyptian daily Al-Masri Al-Yawm at the end of May, for example, Haftar indicated that he welcomed military intervention by Libya’s neighbours: “Of course I support any military strike that aims to secure Egyptian borders, even if it takes place inside Libya. We would like to get rid of these groups in Derna, Benghazi, Egdabia, Sert, Tripoli, and on the Algerian borders. It is impossible for us to allow any of them to carry out any action against neighboring and friendly countries.”
[12] The evacuation of diplomatic staff actually took place somewhat earlier than the source seems to be suggesting. As noted in our last report, the Algerian military carried out an emergency evacuation of the ambassador and 50-strong staff of the embassy in Tripoli on May 16, after receiving “credible information of a serious and imminent threat” against Algerian diplomats in Libya.
[13] Some months ago there were hints that for purposes of border security the Algerian military and/or the DRS had struck up contact with the
Zintan Brigades, which have been one of the major players in south-west Libya since the fall of the Qaddafi regime, although they are far from enjoying full hegemony in this ethnically heterogenous region.
[14] Under the telling headline “Faced with chaos in Libya, the Algerian doctrine called into question”, El Watan claimed in its May 23 edition that: “When John Kerry visited Algiers at the beginning of April, the Americans did indeed put the request [for Algeria to use its military to help stabilise Libya and/or the Sahel] to the Algerian authorities, first and foremost Bouteflika, the General Staff and the DRS. Senior Algeian and American security envoys discussed the details of a more military role for Algeria in Libya. ‘There can be no question of adopting an aggressive policy of crossborder intervention by the Algerian army,’ a military source explains. ‘It is a matter of protecting our national territory from the outside, very close to the borders, by means of swift, ad hoc operations. A major force projection was undertaken during the last few weeks all along the border with Libya, with air support also being prepared at the same time’.”
[15] On June 1, AQMI underlined its growing orientation towards Tunisia with a statement claiming responsibility for an attack on the house of Tunisian Interior Minister Lotfi Ben Jeddou in Kasserine, Tunisia, on May 28 – the first time the organisation has explicitly laid claim to an operation on Tunisian soil. The statement lists the military operations “against the lions of Islam in Chaambi Mountains” the “oppression of Ansar Al-Sharia, placed by the criminals who rule Tunisia on the list of terrorist organisations in the hope this will earn them sympathy from the head of the infidels, America, and the corrupt generals in Algeria”. AQMI’s message goes on to deny involvement in “any targeting of civilians in Tunisian towns and villages,” claiming that “any such operations are the dirty work of the authorities who then blame them on the mujahideen to tarnish their image and isolate them from their popular base, following the example of the criminal generals of Algeria”. It would seem that the group that carried out the Kasserine attack, which left four policemen dead, was made up of a mix of Tunisians and Algerians – Tunisian security said three of the five jihadists where Algerian nationals.
[16] Note however that Dirj is located to the east of Ghadames, way to the north of the Djanet segment of the border.
